Attachment 4 NEPA Medical Advisory Panel Subcommittee No. IX Proceedings. Report No. NEPA 1110-1ER-20. July 22, 1949. Washington, D.C. 56p. NEPA Project Report 1110-1ER-20, July 22, 1959 (NEPA Medical Advisory Panel Subcommittee No. II) JOINT PANEL ON MEDICAL ASPECTS OF ATOMIC WARFARE ILLEGIBLE FAIRCHILD ENGINE AND AIRPLANE CORPORATION Dr. McCormic Dr. Pianni Dr. Fitzpatrick Cmtr. Polland Maj. Nutsell Maj. Baldges GIF OAK RIDGE TENNESSEE GIF FAIRCHILD ENGINE AND AIRPLANE CORPORATION NEPA MEDICAL ADVISORY PANEL SUBCOMMITTEE NO. IX Washington, D.C. Report No. NEPA 1110-IER-20 Date July 22, 1949 NEPA DIVISION OAK RIDGE, TENNESSEE NEPA MEDICAL ADVISORY PANEL SUBCOMMITTEE NO. IX An Evaluation of the Psychological Problem of Crew Selection Relative to the Special Hazards of Irradiation Exposure. Washington, D.C. July 22, 1949 ______ ATTENDANCE (Committee) SELLE, DR. W. A. (CHAIRMAN) University of Texas School of Medicine Galveston, Texas BOWMAN, DR. KARL M. University of California Berkeley, California DORCUS, DR. ROY U.C.L.A., Los Angeles FLICKINGER, COLONEL DON 8th Air Force, Carswell Field, Ft. Worth, Texas SELLS, DR. SAUL School of Aviation Medicine Randolph Field, Texas (Guests) BEHRENDS, CAPTAIN C. F. Medicine and Surgery United States Navy BLOUNT, LT. COL. R. H. Office of the Air Surgeon Washington, D.C. CHAMBERS, LT. COMDR. F. W. Naval Medical Research Institute, Bethesda, MD COONEY, COLONEL J. P. A.E.C., Washington, D.C. DeBAUN, LT. COL. C. W. Armed Forces Special Weapons Project Washington, D.C. 3 ATTENDANCE (Cont'd) (Guests) HARRIS, COMDR. E. P. Medicine and Surgery United States Navy PINSON, MAJOR E. A. Aero Medical Laboratory Wright Field, Ohio TIPTON, CAPTAIN V. C. Medicine and Surgery United States Navy TUTTLE, DR. L. W. A.E.C., Washington, D.C. WISE, LIEUTENANT Office of the Air Surgeon Washington, D.C. COWEN, DON NEPA Project KALITINSKY, ANDREW NEPA Project KAUFMAN, F. B. NEPA Project 4 - - - - - - - PROCEEDINGS CHAIRMAN SELLE: The meeting of this panel, which is Subcommittee II of the NEPA Medical Advisory Committee on Radiation Tolerance of Military Personnel, has been called to evaluate the psychological problem of selection of crew members of nuclear propelled aircraft relative to the radiation hazard, and to consider research which may be advisable in this field. This is not a closed meeting. Some of our advisors (psychologists and psychiatrists) have not been cleared. Ordinarily, medical and biological discussions are not, of course, classified. We shall ask you, however, to refrain from discussing these matters on the outside, since of course we do not want newspapers to know of these discussions at this time. Before we go into the deliberations of the morning, I would like to introduce the various members of the regular committee, our special guests of the day, and the NEPA officials here today. To my left is Colonel R. H. Blount of the Office of the Air Surgeon, who is a member of the Panel on Medical Aspects of Atomic Warfare of the Research and Development Board of NME; Colonel James Cooney, Chief, Radiological Branch, Division of Military Applications of the A.E.C.; Lieutenant Wise, also of the Office of the Air Surgeon; Dr. Saul Sells, of the Department of Clinical Psychology, School of Aviation Medicine, Randolph Field, Texas; Commander E. P. Harris, Head of Neuropsychiatry Branch, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, U.S. Navy; Lt. Colonel C. W. DeBaun, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project; Dr. Karl Bowman, of the Langley Porter Clinic, and Professor of Psychiatry, Medical School, University of California, San Francisco; Colonel Don Flickinger, Air Surgeon, 8th Air Force, Carswell Field, Texas; Lt. Commander F. W. Chambers of the Naval Medical Research Institute, Bethesda; Mr. F. B. Kauffman, Assistant General Manager of the NEPA Project, who is now stationed here in Washington. At the far end of the table, to the right, is Captain Tipton of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery of the Navy; Major E. A. Pinson, of the Aero Medical Laboratory, Wright Field, Ohio; Dr. Roy Dorcus, Professor of Psychology, University of California at Los Angeles. Captain C. F. Behrens, Director of the Naval Medical Research Institute at Bethesda, also of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery of the Navy; Dr. L. W. Tuttle, of the Division of Biology and Medicine, Atomic Energy Commission; Mr. Andrew Kalitinsky, Chief Engineer of the NEPA Project; and to my right, Mr. Don Cowen, Director of Technical Information of the NEPA Project. Most of you are aware of the problem which we have to consider today, but in order to begin the discussions with a common background for all, I should like to reach excerpts of the letter I sent to the regular members early this month when we invited them to participate in this meeting: 5 "The NEPA Project is charged with the responsibility of developing aircraft propelled by nuclear energy. Associated with this undertaking are a number of problems involving the hazard of ionizing radiations. "While the level of radiation exposure received by the crew of the nuclear propelled plane is expected to produce no significant physiological effects of consequence on an ordinary mission, it is possible that exposure levels capable of producing minor to serious consequences will prevail under unusual circumstances of great urgency. "Thus, one aspect of the radiation hazard is the possibility of fear being engendered in pilots and other crew members who might receive, during a single mission, sufficient irradiation to cause either immediate or delayed physiological effects. To what extent will fear of injurious radiations affect the conduct and performance of crew members? "It is agreed that the psychological factor would be considerable in many instances. Can satisfactory screening tests be devised for selecting crew members who will not react adversely to the special hazard of radiation? "Members of the NEPA Medical Advisory Committee are not competent to appraise this psychological problem nor to recommend research. No one of us is an experienced psychologist. "We are therefore seeking assistance from qualified individuals outside of the Advisory Committee in the evaluation of the problem and in recommending desired research." I would like to go back a bit further with regard to the history of this subcommittee to say that at a meeting in Chicago, on the 14th of May, the Committee recommended nine research projects. The ninth recommendation concerns the evaluation of the psychological problem which we have before us today. The Advisory Committee had previously prepared a report, "Tabulation of Available Data Relative to Radiation Biology." This compilation is placed before you. Many of you have already had an opportunity to see this report. You will observe on Page 7 of this publication a prediction of what will happen to individuals who receive doses of irradiation ranging from 25 r to 400 r. I would like to review with you rather quickly some of the estimates that have been made, since these have a direct bearing on the matter before us. For exposures of 25 r or under, we have indicated that there will be no detectable clinical effects. There may be some delayed effects, but we have stated that these are highly improbable. It is possible that a single mission may not expose individuals to more than this amount of irradiation. 6 We then come to the physiological effects which might be produced by 50 r. We have indicated that for this exposure level there may be slight transient reduction in some of the blood elements, but no other clinical detectable effects. Under paragraph 2 of "B" we have stated that delayed effects are possible, but not serious effects on the average individual are very improbable. If we go to the 100 r level, we see that there may be immediate effect in the form of gastro-intestinal disturbances, as indicated by nausea and possibly vomiting, and in addition there may be fatigue. I have said nothing about the genetic effects since for military purposes these, I think, can be ignored. Under the delayed effect of 100 r, as indicated in paragraph 2, page 8, we can expect a slight shortening of the life span. It has been estimated that the shortening may amount to about 1 percent, considering all the factors involved in life expectancy. At 200 r more immediate effects may be noticeable such as nausea and vomiting. Fatigue will, of course, be increased; and at this level certain other physiological effects can be expected. Besides the changes in blood elements, there might be temporary sterility; and it is possible that the incidence of leukemia will be increased, as also the incidence of tumor formation. At this level fatalities may occur in a small proportion of the irradiated individuals 2-6 weeks after exposure. At 400 r it is estimated that virtually everyone would be immediately incapacitated and many would never recover. This value is in the neighborhood of the estimated LD 50 for man. I am going to ask Mr. Kalitinsky to say a word now about the expected radiation hazard of a normal flight, so far as he can discuss this in an unclassified meeting of this type. Mr. Kalitinsky. MR. KALITINSKY: I can say in general that we believe we will have to design these airplanes in such a manner that the crew will receive an exposure of approximately 1 r per hour. The longest mission that one would expect, probably considerably longer than the average, would be of the order of 24 hours, so that we would be in the region of the 25 r acute exposure for one mission. The thinking on that is that there won't be too many of these airplanes, and a crew might be expected to perform only one mission, or maybe several missions spaced considerably apart, months or even more than a year apart. That in general is the level that appears necessary in order to provide satisfactory performance in the airplane from the point of view of shield weight and so on. 7 It might be of interest to you to look at the problem of training of the crews. The thinking there is that there will have to be conventionally powered versions of this plane available, not only for this purpose but for research, on which most of the actual training can be accomplished as far as flight conditions are concerned. There will also have to be power plants of this type operating on the ground where they can be completely shielded so that the radiation levels are negligible, and on which the pilots and flight engineers can learn the actual operation and control of the power plant. However, we feel that it is important that -- and this is a bit of amateur psychology -- we would probably have to provide at least one or two flight hours in the real thing, even though the controls might be arranged so that they respond exactly the same in the conventionally-powered airplane as in the nuclear-powered airplane. Still, it would probably require at least one or three hours of flight with the real thing before we could send a crew on a wartime mission with an airplane of this sort. So from this point of view the exposure schedule with a typical crew might amount to a few, possibly 2 to 5, exposures of 1 r or less each, followed by actual missions at which the exposures might range from, say 10 r to 25 r for a mission, there being only one or not more than a few missions in the entire lifetime of the crew. The missions would be very short and spaced at considerable intervals. I think that covers it. CHAIRMAN SELLE: To guide our deliberations from here on, I would like to indicate a few objectives for today's conference. There are three or four recommendations which I think we should try to obtain from this group of qualified individuals. The first of these, of course, is to determine whether or not the radiation hazard represents a unique problem psychologically, a problem of sufficient importance as to merit special attention in the selection of the crew or to warrant special screening tests. It is a unique problem, or is it merely a problem which requires or places high weight or high priority on anxiety tolerance and emotional stability? Secondly, if it is a unique problem, how can it be resolved? What psychological tests are required? Where can research be done most effectively in this field? Is any other work being done now in this field, or is any work contemplated in this field? If it is, we would like to know about it. If work is being done, should it be augmented? Also, what are the manpower requirements for research in this field? How long would it take to obtain answers to the obvious questions, and what would it cost to carry on this research? 8 Also, we would like to have an expression from you later on about a matter which I presume the Advisory Committee will decide on eventually, but about which they may like to have your suggestion. That is: Is this a project which the Air Force alone should handle? Should we alert the Air Force to the needs in this special field, if we determine that it is a unique problem? Or should this be a joint project of the Air Force, the Navy, and NEPA? I might say that so far as I see the problem there is no desire on the part of NEPA to do this work. It probably could be done much better by someone else. However, if no one else is going to consider the problem, and we feel that such work should be done, then NEPA may have to do it. Now, going into the first objective of the day: Does the radiation hazard represent a unique psychological problem? I think we might well keep in mind the view that an assessment of the radiation hazard should be based on other wartime hazards, not by itself. Colonel Cooney has very nicely expressed the importance of this in his speech, "Psychological Factors in Atomic Warfare," given to the American Public Health Association, at Boston, last November. I am sorry we do not have copies of this to pass around. Colonel Cooney will, I am certain, comment on this later, but I think that we should emphasize now that radiation is one of the many hazards with which the crew will be confronted. In assessing this particular risk, we must keep in mind the other wartime hazards of fire, disease, bullets, bombs, and so on. For my own benefit and enlightenment I have tried to determine some of the favors which go toward building up anxiety in the crew of a bomber, irrespective of the radiation hazard. It seems to me that the crew will be confronted with the following hazards which are essentially common to personnel of all types of bombers. First, such personnel will be faced with the usual hazards of peace-time flying. Secondly, they will be confronted with the usual wartime hazards of flak and interception by fighters and so on. Thirdly, with special hazards such as explosive decompression in pressurized cabins. Fourthly, with the nature of the cargo; knowledge that the crew is custodian of the dreaded A-bomb certainly will heighten anxiety. These, as indicated, will be factors common to all crews. In case of the unconventional nuclear propelled ship, the crew will in addition be aware of the great cost of the aircraft and of an aircraft powered by an incomprehensible force which is as mysterious as the bomb itself. Undoubtedly indoctrination can be of great value in minimizing the fear of these hazards. We come next to the radiation factor itself. Radiations cannot be seen, felt, or otherwise detected. The effects, in small amounts at least, are manifested rather slowly. They may not become evident for many years. Here again an educational program may be able to break down to some extent fear of this hazard. How effective an educational program may be is perhaps the all important question. Some of you, I am sure, will be able to evaluate indoctrination; others of us cannot. 9 There is one other matter which I would like to consider before I throw the meeting open to general discussion, and this deals first with the general reactions of individuals in general to radiations. I think Colonel Cooney's statement in the article referred to indicates the widespread reaction of the military and civilians with regard to the effects of the bomb. Colonel Cooney states: "Since the advent of nuclear explosives in the so-called atom bomb, with its attendant ionizing radiations in massive amounts, unfortunate psychological reactions have developed in the minds of both the military and civilians. This action is one of intense fear and is directed against forces that cannot be seen, felt, or otherwise sensed. I have observed the reactions of the military who were not acquainted with the technical details, on two missions, Bikini and Eniwetok; and the fear reaction of the uninitiated is appalling. The fear reaction of the uninitiated civilian is every evident. It is of such magnitude that it could well interfere with an important military mission in time of war." Colonel Cooney minimizes to some extent these hazards, and he stresses the importance of assessing the radiation hazard in light of other wartime hazards. He also makes the very important statement that for battle discipline and military effectiveness it is not the hazard, but the solider's estimate of the hazard, that counts. It seems to me that is the crux of the whole matter. To what extent can indoctrination change the soldier's estimate of the hazard? It is our estimate of the soldier's estimate, I think, that we need at this time. The meeting is open for general discussion. In order to start the ball rolling, we might ask Colonel Cooney to comment on some of the matters which he thinks are pertinent to our discussion, and which perhaps parallel the psychological factors in atomic warfare for which he is well known. COLONEL COONEY: Our duty as Army officers, it seems to me, is to prepare men to go to war; and we cannot do so effectively by instilling fear into our soldiers. We must instill courage. I don't mean that we must lie to them. We certainly never should do that, but we must evaluate the laws of probabilities. I think that is where we have been falling down. I note in this very excellent report that all along is stressed the few probable things that might happen. I note that it says with 200 r we might have possible permanent sterility in rare instances. Well now, that may be very probable in a man near 60 years of age, or 65 or 70. I have been unable clinically to sterilize permanently anyone with 200 r. 10 If we were to not emphasize the laws of probability to these individuals, we are defeating our purpose. I talked to a colonel not long ago who told me that when he left for North Africa he was frightened to the extent that he thought when he arrived there the best thing that could happen to him was to be shot. Now, this gentleman was a colonel. The medicos had told him that if he drank the water he would get typhoid or dysentery; that if he swam in the water he would get schistosomiasis; he was very likely going to have poor food and couldn't eat the food. If he did, he would get dysentery. I don't believe it is right to frighten individuals to that extent. Let me tell you the reaction of the military in Eniwetok. I was called over one day to a conference on Eniwetok Island, which was some twenty miles away from the first detonation. I found a general there briefing the men who were going to be on the island. He had about a ten-page document. They were going to put food and water in sealed cans and bury them under the ground. They had a complete series of gongs and whistles, gong was to ring; everybody was to run and get a pair of old shoes, a raincoat, a rain hat; they were all to assemble. Then the whistle was to blow. They were to be on board the ship in fifteen minutes. If they were not aboard the ship, they were to be left. He had his men so frightened that they didn't know what they were doing. I saw two soldiers going around the morning of the first detonation with rosary beads around their necks. An Irishman is no good when you frighten him to that extent. I went in to get a cup of coffee before the first detonation, and there was a colored boy in the board room. I said, "Aren't you going up to see the bomb?" He said, "I don't want to mess with it." I had a sailor bring in a little piece of material one night that he picked up, part of the equipment of the experiments. I thanked him for it and told him to go wash his hands, and he just froze. He thought he was irradiated. We had some fall-out from the cloud one afternoon, a very small amount. It was cloudy and looked like it was going to rain. We put out the information to evade the rainfall, if possible; and if they got in the rainfall, to take a bath. The whole maneuver stopped like that. The pilots landed their planes and went inside. The men drove the "ducks" on shore. The admiral sent for me and was very much excited. He received a wire that he was getting .4 mr per hour, and he thought that .4 meant four-tenths r; we had four times our tolerance, and we ought to get out of there right now. I am not criticizing the admirals or the generals or the soldiers. I am criticizing the people, me included, who put this out. I think we have a very serious problem on our hands. I know we do. When we arrived back in Honolulu, we had some contamination in some of the intakes in the air vents. We might just as well have had smallpox 11 on board; we wouldn't have had any more trouble. We had to go out the next day, round up all the monitors, bring them back, and go over all the strips. If we are going to fight a ware with that type of psychology, we can well defeat ourselves. An Army officer came to me, a colonel, a graduate of the War College. He said, "I own a home in Newburgh, New York, and I am going to sell the damned thing." I said, "Why?" He said, "They are sure to bomb New York, and those radiations will get me up there." I told him perhaps it would be a good idea to sell it because he would probably be trampled on by all the people getting out of New York. I really think this is a very serious problem and something that really calls for a lot of education. I think one thing we must do is separate our thinking from people who are going to be working in radiations all their lives, and it is very important to stay away from chronic doses of radiation day after day, because it is bad. We know that. But there is certainly a difference between a man who is working thirty years and a man who is getting one acute exposure. I think this can be well compared with other hazards of war. People died of malaria. They die of beriberi, and they die of tuberculosis. That is the type of information that we must give to our soldiers and sailors and so forth. How as to this thing of genetics. I read an article in Science Newsletter -- I am sorry I don't have it here. I should advise you to look it up, by Dr. Muller. I read it just the other day. It was a very excellent article. He says both sides are wrong in this affair -- these people who are saying nothing will happen and the people who are saying that everything will happen. He said that as far back as 1940 he had made the statement that if all the people in the country received a dose of radiation that was just under the amount that would keep them from reproducing, that you would not find the genetic effects in the next generation or the next generation. It would probably be thousands of years, even then you could not put your finger on the radiation as being the cause of the mutations, because they would be so masked by the normal mutations that are occurring. But he brings out the very important point that they will occur some time, and who are we to say that a man's life three thousand years from now is not important? I think it is very good for us from the military standpoint, but it is not up to us to say that we are going to war. We are told to go to war. And if we go to war, it is nice for us to be able to tell the soldier that their children are not going to have three heads, and probably their children's children are not going to have three heads, and there again they are not going to have any unusual mutations. It is just an increase in the normal mutations that occur. But that is just a little part in itself. You were all in the last war and you saw the psychological problems we had -- psychiatric problems possibly I should say -- and it was really of great magnitude. Now, if we multiply it by this sort of thing, we are actually tying our hands, I believe. 12 CHAIRMAN SELLE: Captain Behrens, you have had a great deal of experience in radiology. What are your views with regard to this particular problem. CAPTAIN BEHRENS: I have always felt, like Colonel Cooney, that we have a definite psychological problem associated with radiation, which is allied, I believe, to the general fear of something that is mysterious. I have seen phobias in that every since I became involved in radiation therapy. I saw a good instance of that in Pensacola back in about 1925. It so happened that in the very early days of I-rays, when tubes were poor and voltages low, some old lady had received an abdominal burn while pictures were being taken of her kidney. The effect of that publicity continued something like that of the bombs on Japan. The time element I suppose was over ten years, but this old lady lived a long while with the burns. I could tell whenever anybody came in from that little town; the hesitated for a while and they would hem and haw and say, "Doctor, is this going to burn me?" Everyone who came from that town for treatment was apprehensive and thought he would be burned. There is the fear of the unknown in radiations. With respect to the psychological question under discussion I would expect that the answer lies in the usual screening out of people who have undue tendencies to anxiety, and the rest of it is educational. Familiarity with the problems and knowledge of what to expect, I think, will have the greatest effect in reassuring people and keeping them from becoming excited. On the one hand we have hysteria and a panic reaction; and on the other hand, the reaction of indifference. Because one doesn't see it, doesn't hear it, and doesn't sense it, they are always a few -- not very many, I suppose -- who take what George Lyons calls the "hairy- chested approach" -- "A little radiation can't hurt me." Commander Harris can tell you of the psychological effects of the bomb. He observed the panic reaction in Japan, as he got there shortly after the bomb went off. CHAIRMAN SELLE: Commander, could we hear from you? COMMANDER HARRIS: I presented a paper last year to the American Psychiatric Association, following a paper by Dr. Bowers of the Atomic Energy Commission, pointing out some of the hazards. I described some of my experiences at Nagasaki following a large number of interviews with the population there. I went in with a hospital ship on a prison rescue mission a little over three weeks after the blast, and tried to make every possible contract I could with everyone who had been there. Since that experience, I think I participated in some ten or fifteen such discussions as this with various people around Washington, and they all came to the same conclusion. 13 I was interested in Colonel Cooney's remarks here, that what it appears to be is partly a fear of fear, and a fear of the unknown. Education, plus the usual prescription of screening out susceptible people, is the answer. I am beginning to wonder when we are going to start this job of education, because actually I have been hearing it now for two years. I do think that, based on my observation of the Japanese people, their reactions seems to be a continuing one, so that observations made as late three weeks after would seem to have considerable validity in that this fear of the unknown reduces them essentially to a state of apathy which renders any effective group operation practically nil. That fear of the unknown which was still saturating the groups there was so effectively demonstrated in these people running up to an American in uniform, especially a physician, and wanting to know if they are going to die. Usually they would come to recognize the firs thing to look for is the petechiae, and they would bare their arm and hold it out for you to examine. It was a startling experience from that standpoint. As a matter of fact, it affected my whole makeup so that I have continued to be very interested in that from a psychological standpoint and in finding some solution that will begin to meet the obvious, really tremendous, psychological implications of atomic, and in a broader sense, A, B, C, warfare. Those are all general remarks. I don't know that I have anything specific to add, except that I am head of the Neuropsychiatry Branch of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, which has a continuing program looking towards a long aim of establishing what we call preventive psychiatry in contrast to a static hospital-type of psychiatry -- psychiatry that gets out and helps people with fear before they reach the point where they need to be institutionalized. CHAIRMAN SELLE: I would like to ask: Do you think that proper indoctrination will make it possible to reduce the fear of radiation, say at the level of 50 r or zero? COMMANDER HARRIS: I really do, yes, sir; because what people need to have to organize themselves around with regard to anxiety and fear is reality. Of course, there are many factors involved. One factor that concerns me with today's problem of effective manpower in the armed forces is the fact that there seems to be social forces operating in our own culture that operate in a negative sense in preparing a young man to accept the responsibilities of service in the armed forces; I mean that support him and give him the motivation to really get in and shout the old battle cry. I support the most outstanding manifestation of that sort of thing going on in our culture was the hysterical demand for demobilization that practically tore the armed force apart after this last war. That to me is cultural malignancy that doesn't recognize responsibility of the individual to country; I think that, for instance, is one of the broad factors of the situation. 14 But I feel strongly that we should that we should give each individual the facts of the situation, whether they are negative or positive, whether they are constructive or destructive -- the "so many of you are going to die" philosophy. This approach might be frightening to a lot of people, but I believe that the average Army and Marine Corps fighting man can organize himself around that knowledge, assume some element of gamble and go on to do an effective job. It is fear of fear and fear of the unknown that really reduce an individual to ineffective levels. CHAIRMAN SELLE: Thank you. Colonel Blount, do you have something to add to this discussion? COLONEL BLOUNT: At this moment, Dr. Selle, I think that education will be of great benefit. I know that during the last war we had over a million psychiatric casualties. We supposedly had very excellent selection methods, which in my mind must have been very poor as judged from those figures. If we are going to take a highly specialized aircraft such as is being considered at this meeting today, I am certain we will have to come up with some new methods of selection. Just what those are going to be, research may have to decide. General Grove has been quite concerned with this problem, and has established a program which he intends to develop during the next few years. Dr. Selle here is interested in that program. The fact that he has gotten a psychological research clinic started down at Randolph field, with psychological and psychiatric tests for the screening of pilots, indicates an attempt to keep up with the increasing problems of pilots and other crew members. But the method of selecting these pilots for a highly specialized and different type of aircraft is going to be another problem. I think we definitely will have to be do research on that. CHAIRMAN SELLE: Before we call on the psychologists, I would like to bear a few more general remarks by other guests. Dr. Tuttle of the A.E.C., what do you have to contribute to this discussion? DR. TUTTLE: Not a great deal. I am here mainly to pick up ideas. But it seems the point is well taken that we should publicly make the distinction between our protective devices designed for those people who are going to work for their lifetime in radioactive atmospheres, versus those devices which should be taken against large bodies of people who will be incidentally and temporarily exposed to large amounts of radiation. It seems that part of the hysteria we have today is engendered by the fact that very elaborate precautions taken for our atomic workers gets out into the public, and the whole public fears a tenth of an r a day. 15 We have a large reservoir of data from therapy. Please excuse a personal reference. I think I have had somewhere between 150 and 200 r of diagnostic radiation over a period of years; I still can prove that I am not sterile. One might be able in the course of indoctrinating your pilots to show them that we do have evidence that they are not going to be harmed by occasional exposure. It might be desirable to work out this psychiatric study on the more limited group of pilots that will be concerned with NEPA prior to carrying it over into the education of the general public because thee is a good possibility of making mistakes. The place to find out if you are on the wrong track is when you are working with a limited and fairly restricted group. Another problem that we face is the fact that no matter what we say today in a ten-page release which is pretty carefully drawn up, someone is going to pick out one phrase which is worth a headline and it goes into big type; the rest of it is overlooked. CHAIRMAN SELLE: Captain Tipton, you have had considerable experience in radiation indoctrination. What are you views? CAPTAIN TIPTON: I believe that the problems of NEPA could be compared to those of civilian defense. I think education will certainly have to be very well supervised if it is to be effective, because we have so many pseudo-educators who probably create more hysteria than real educators can overcome. It was rather refreshing, I think, to see the attitude of many of the workers in the A.E.C. installations. I never did see any evidence of the fear on the part of the maintenance group in the project. Some gentlemen might have seen fear in the earlier stages, but I never did see any evidence of it except on the part of a few scientists when something unusual happened, or someone in the lower echelon of the scientific field. CHAIRMAN SELLE: I would like to ask Colonel Flickinger, Air Surgeon of the 8th Air Force, Fort Worth, to give us his views. COLONEL FLICKINGER: I am knee-deep in this problem of detoxifying stresses for air crews right now. Teaching combat veterans from the 29's to accept decompression through the range of differential that would occur in the hull is, I believe, germane to the problem. When we began flying our superbomber, the 36, we ran up against the problem of convincing them that the explosive decompression through the increased range, in other words going from 6.5 to 7.45 differential, could occur without immediate disabling of the entire crew. The point I would like to bring out in this particular problem is that indoctrination in the form of talks and movies was partially successful; but it did not allay their fears of this increased stress, the magnitude of this increased stress. This introduction even included going up in the chamber and showing them that they could accept this differential and still be functioning airmen, and capable of performing a life-saving act. It included that. 16 But in spite of this, when we went aloft with the crews and started from 35,000 to go on up to 40,000 and above, we immediately sensed a tension. One couldn't mistake it. Everybody became very unrelaxed, whereas a previous state of lack of tension had been observed. However, when the indoctrination education went to the point of actually taking an airplane aloft with the crew in it and accomplishing the decompression under actual operating conditions, showing the crew that they could get the airplane down and that no one would fall onto the floor with blood coming out of his mouth, then it eased the situation. The main point I would like to make relative to this present problem is that a lot can be done in education of our air crews. Incidentally, I might put in here that I think one of the best samplings we could carry out with our educational program would be to take some of our atom bomb crews and start this indoctrination program on them. Although I am sure that education will accomplish a great deal, the big question in my mind is: How are we going to bring the reality of this stress to the air crewman, and do we have to do it? Is the thing so obtuse to the crewman that we stop at the point of fairly simple indoctrination, recognizing that he is primarily fearful of physical acts of violence to his person, plus a special threat to what he calls his "family jewels." I just don't know. I do have a feeling that the closer we bring our detoxification process to reality, the better off we will be; but I don't know how we are going to accomplish it in this particular stress. CHAIRMAN SELLE: It is time now to hear from some of the psychologists. Dr. Dorcus, we might call on you first. DR. DORCUS: I am new in this picture, but as I listened to the discussion here, there are two major problems, and I am not sure that they are coordinated with each other. One of the discussions seems to center about the general problem of types of personnel and some of the reactions that may develop. The other is the specific problem of selection of men for aircraft piloting and other duties on the plane. That may represents a different problem from the educational problem in part that will be involved in the over-all project. I am not sure that it would be too wise to link the two problems together. I think ultimately some of the facts that will apply to one situation will not apply to the other. I tried to analyze it myself a little bit, what I thought some of the anxieties associated with this sort of operation would be; and I think they are pretty well stated here. But there is the ordinary anxiety in the hazards of flight, possible loss of procreation powers, anxiety as to the possible shortening of the life span, and one other which I haven't heard mentioned very much here this morning. This is the question which exists in the minds of the civilian group, at least, and that is whether the medical group have actually discovered thus far all the effects of radiation on human beings. I think that is 17 going to be one of the most insidious things to combat, because it comes right down to the point that while you say these are the effects, the individual seriously questions that these are all of the effects. That really involves the problem of creating confidence in the research work and medical diagnosis with regard to radiation effects. It is just another one of these problems. Have we discovered all the medical effects? I don't know whether you want me to give you some information about types of approaches to this problem. I think that might better be deferred. CHAIRMAN SELLE: I think so. We should settle the first objective. Is it a unique problem? Then we can come back later to the approaches. Dr. Saul SellS of the School of Aviation Medicine, Randolph Field, has been giving this problem considerable attention. I am sure that he has some suggestions to make. DR. SELLS: There is one point I would like to make at first, and that is, as several of the speakers have already pointed out with regard to education or indoctrination procedures, we not only have the problem of how to approach it; but I think that an ethical question is introduced, as Colonel Cooney suggested in his opening remarks, which is illustrated in some of the sentences in the section of your Available Data on Radiation Biology. For example, when you talk about probable delayed effects possible, unknown, and so forth, what is the proper evaluation of the ethical question as to who to treat the possible or probable unknown effects? And that ties in with what Dr. Dorcus said, too. I am not going to suggest a solution to that problem now, but I think that will be an important issue in facing it; and certainly we can create more anxiety by being scientifically scrupulous than if we simply treated these matters as we are inclined to treat other matters in our every-day life. A point that I thought was extremely important when I first talked with you, Dr. Selle, about this problem is that we are looking at this more or less in an isolated point of view, without taking in to consideration all of the other factors that are involved in atomic missions or in just ordinary missions. I think that the high altitude problem that Colonel Flickinger brought up is probably as important as any, and will be until some definite techniques of meeting it are worked out. My own experience is that the altitude problem is one of the most fears of all problems that pilots encounter. On a flight the entire aspect of the mission is important -- how it is made, how long in advance the crew knows about, where they are going, what their possibility of getting back is, what they may or may not encounter, whether 18 they may have to bail out over contaminated areas. There are so many things involved that I think it is wrong to consider this as a special problem divorced from the entire situation which the mean have to confront. I also would like to point out that we should not concern ourselves only with the pilot, because anxiety and fear and other emotional problems are different in group situations than they are even in individual situations, and we have to consider every man in the crew. That means; then, as Dr. Selle has indicated, that this is an air crew problem and not a problem of the pilot alone. Just one word about the research that we are doing. While this may not be the time to discuss it, we have begun a research program in the School of Aviation Medicine on many problems involved in psychiatric screening. The more I study it, and I have just come from a three-day conference in New York with a number of people working in individual areas, the more futile it seems to try to devise psychiatric screening tests. We run into contradictory premises and contradictory proposals. However, I think that our salvation may be that we are going to use empirical principles rather than proceed entirely from theoretical grounds; and some of the results that we have already are based on tests that have been giving to cadets and student officers at Randolph field. Such tests are beginning to show glimpses of discrimination between the men who are making successful adjustment to military flying and those who are not. However, we will be a long way from solving this problem even if we can discriminate between men who can complete pilot training successfully -- and here I am not talking about flying the airplane, but adjusting to the problems, the tensions and anxieties, hostilities, frustrations, and so forth, that arise -- and when who do not, because we have no knowledge at all whether such an adjustment will in any way be related to adjustment to combat situations. The difference between many of the requirements of wartime and peace-time adjustment is so different that we will have to go a long way with our research before we can make any claims of that nature. However, we think that we should device instruments for measuring things that we think should be measured and then take them to the situations. We can get close to combat problems by studying crews that go on long-range fuel-saving missions and others. But we see no point in doing that yet, because our instruments aren't good enough yet to warrant that type of approach. I think perhaps in another year or two -- Colonel Blount -- we may be close to that. Perhaps I am being optimistic, but people who would like us to turn out results in two or three months will have to be patient; perhaps this is only an ego defense, but I think we have to be conservative in our estimates. 19 CHAIRMAN SELLE: Before I ask our psychiatrist, Dr. Bowman, to give us his views, there are one or two other gentlemen here whom I have not yet called on. Major Pinson, I wonder if you have something to contribute? May I inquire as to your specific interests at Wright Field? MAJOR PINSON: I am a physiologist. I work in the Engineering Division of the Aero Medical Laboratory at Wright Field. CHAIRMAN SELLE: We would appreciate having your suggestions. MAJOR PINSON: I feel very much a neophyte in this group here and don't believe I have anything to contribute. It seems to me that the fix we find ourselves in with regard to this particular problem is one that we have created ourselves; other than that, it seems to me that the problem is not different from others, such as the explosive decompression and seat ejection problems, that have been mentioned this morning. Pilots have the same apprehension concerning seat ejection as they have concerning radiation. It is a matter of proving that the seat is not a hazard; it is somewhat different to can't-see radiation. I think this has been brought about due to the difference in the scientific point of view and the service point of view. The scientist when he views a problem and makes a statement, wants to be sure that that statement is a fact, absolutely and purely; and yet in many of your service problems you can't make those statements. You have to make them with a certain degree of reservation. I think that is what we have to do in this problem. We are going to have to make a statement that a man can tolerate a certain amount of radiation, 25 r perhaps; and we are going to have to make that statement knowing that 25 r may in some way or other do harm to a few individuals who might receive it. COLONEL COONEY: In answer to that, I believe that the general public is under the opinion that we don't know very much about this condition. I believe that is erroneous. I think we do know a lot about it. We certainly don't know the answers to all the problems, but neither do we know the answers to all of the problems in any form of medicine. We see a patient with tuberculosis of the left apex. We can't assure that patient what is going to happen to him in six months or two months. We see nephritis. We see high blood pressure. We haven't the answer to our medical problems by any manner of means, and we do know a lot about this. We have a good idea of a median dose. We have a good idea of a lethal dose. We have a good idea what goes on in the blood, the regenerative powers of the bone marrow. We have a lot of information. I think that is one thing we must correct. They say, "Well, the doctors don't know anything about this." We do. We know just about as much about it as we do about many other diseases that people take for granted, as nephritis or even tuberculosis. 20 Even today people die of appendicitis, which is suppose to be a very simple thing, and they die with good doctors taking care of them, because we don't know all about appendicitis. The man who has not made a mistake diagnosis in appendicitis is the man who has not seen very many cases. CAPTAIN BEHRENS: I think part of the misapprehension comes from the fact that those of us who are involved in it are very frequently debating the need for research; we put the emphasis on what we don't know the things we have to find the answer for. So the idea is developed and passed around that we know little or nothing, whereas actually we have a considerable amount of knowledge. Of course, we don't have the final answer we are looking for, and we are always defending ourselves for requests for money for research we want to do. CHAIRMAN SELLE: Colonel DeBaun, I believe you are from the Special Weapons Division of the Armed Forces. What are you views with regard to this? COLONEL DeBAUN: Most of the problems have been pretty well stated by this time. I think this is not a special problem so far as aircraft of this sort are concerned. It is just one of the additional problems that the air crews are going to be forced to face. The problem will probably have to be handled as one in selection of individuals who can receive the indoctrination and take it in the way which will be successful. CHAIRMAN SELLE: Dr. Bowman, having heard these various views of radiologists and psychologists, what are your reactions with regard to this problem? Do you consider it a unique problem requiring special techniques for screening of the crew. DR. BOWMAN: I have to start out by saying that I am no expert in radiation and know comparatively little about it. As I have been listening, it seemed to me that you brought up three problems. The first was the problem of selection of personnel who would be working with radiations, particularly those who would be members of the crews and other personnel connected with these plants. Second, there was the problem of indoctrination, of desensitizing the personnel and giving them the desirable attitude toward this whole danger. Third, there was the problem of the general attitude of the public and what might be done about that. As had been said by others, this last seems to be a very different problem and hardly belongs in the same discussion with the first two. My impression is that it is not a unique problem at all. We had an experience recently which has convinced me further of that. About a year ago I thought we should do some work with radioactive iodine, iodine 131, on thyroid function in mentally sick patients. In cooperation with the Department of Radiology and the Department of 21 Medicine, we set up an experiment at the Langley Porter Clinic to study both mentally sick and normal persons. Immediately everybody said, "Well, you must not let people know you have radioactive substances around here. Everybody will be upset; in a mental hospital, this will be terrible." We went ahead with our plans. Each off the 40 patients -- and we had everything from mild psychoneuroses to seriously sick schizophrenics -- was told exactly what was going to be done to him. We didn't have a single patient object to having the injection of 150 microcuries of iodine 131; not a single patient got panicky about it, or alarmed at all. We have had 30 or more doctors, nurses, and other volunteer for the work, and nobody has been perturbed about it. Everybody knows that these experiments are going on in the hospital, yet nobody seems to have been disturbed. That is one reason I fee that a good deal of the fear of radiations as we see it in the public is essentially the fear of the unknown. The dangers have been enormously magnified; and as has been said, we have emphasized for purposes of getting funds for research how little we know. So I feel that there is no unique problem here. I doubt if a satisfactory, specific test can be devised to determine how a person would react to the radiation hazard apart from other hazards. Maybe there can; but I don't believe we know of such a procedure at the present time. The effect on the germ plasma, of course, is one of the unique things about this problem. I assume that the crew and other people concerned with this ship are to be young, vigorous men, rather than individuals around 60 or so who would not be too concerned whether or not they are capable of reproducing further. The problem would seem to be specific in that the personnel that you are going to have will be individuals who are specifically concerned with their potency and their ability to have children. We need to recognize this. As has been pointed out, the contagiousness of emotion is one of the most important things we have to keep in mind. The admonition that we must not only indoctrinate those who are flying the planes, but also the ground crews is, I believe, a very important observation, because emotion spreads from one person to another. It is said that hysteria is the most contagious disease there is. It is more contagious than smallpox or any other disease. It would seem to me that you have the same general problems of picking competent personnel for this work as you have for any of the other hazardous occupations. I personally don't see that you have any very specific or unique problem here. I would like to close by saying that it seems to me we learned from World War I and World War II that all of our techniques of examination and rejection were quite inadequate and unsatisfactory. We can throw 22 out some very gross cases of individuals who are not suitable, but there are many borderline cases that we do not yet know how to evaluate. Although thee are different problems in civilian life and military life, it is agreed that in general the man who makes the best soldier is the person who has made the best citizen beforehand. The individual who has adjusted well to ordinary life and who has shown himself a pretty competent person is the one who is most likely to be so in military life. Beside the question of the individual himself, there are two other factors in selection which have been considered to be of great importance. One is leadership and the other is motivation. Under suitable leadership, men who are not considered especially good will rise to very excellent heights; under suitable motivation, the same occurs. Likewise, very good men with poor leadership and poor motivation do very badly. So I would feel that those additional points should be thought of in dealing with the problem of selection. CHAIRMAN SELLE: We are coming to the point in our deliberations when we should crystallize the discussion and determine the climate of opinion with regard to this first objective. Before we call for a vote, we will welcome further discussion on the subject. Are there any additional remarks which others might like to make? COMMANDER CHAMBERS: I am a radiation physicist and can only discuss it from that angle. It seems to me the one unique aspect of this problem concerns several sets of criteria that have been established for laymen concerned with radiations. We have one criterion by which we decide that a man should take only .3 of an 4 per week from the standpoint of a thirty-year possibility of subjection to radiation. Then we go to the other extreme and give patients 6000 r to a localized area. The aspect that falls in between is this: Under military operation, just exactly what is the criterion going to be? The field commander is going to have to decide: Well, am I going to have to pull this man out because he has 100 r, or is my objective of such value that I can risk him to possibly 200 r? I think the unique aspect is to bring out the problem that the educational program is such that the layman understands these various criteria, because when we tell X-ray technicians, "You can take only 3 of an r per week," the first question they pop to us is: "What about these patients I have been treating with 300 r a day over a period of two or three weeks?" They want to know what happens to those poor individuals. That is a case of not understanding the problem. Where we were figuring personnel protection on the basis of total-body irradiation, the patient was receiving localized treatment. 23 So I think one aspect to consider in education is the criteria which must be resolved so that the layman is enlightened. CHAIRMAN SELLE: Dr. Sells, you seem to have a question DR. SELLS: What is the number of personnel that would be involved? I get the impression that this is a rather restricted problem, that only a small number of very highly selected men will be used, and only a small number of missions will be involved. I think that the number of personnel involved is an important aspect of this problem, because as Colonel Flickinger can tell you, in the operating commands they have a great advantage from the standpoint of selecting top-notch crews. They have worked with them; they have seen them in operation. I think the commanders probably can do better than the best psychological selection program in picking out top men for the top crews. If we go beyond the obviously good people and we have to select large numbers; then I think the problem becomes a different one. CHAIRMAN SELLE: I don't believe we know at this time what that would amount to but perhaps Mr. Kalitinsky can give us a little information on that. MR. KALITINSKY: It is hard to predict what the usage of airplanes like this will be in addition to delivering A-bombs. They might be used in reconnaissance, of course. But it is very difficult to estimate what the number would be. There won't be many because of the great cost. If you take the extreme case of using a crew only once, you can see that the total number of missions would certainly be of the same order of magnitude as the total number of A-bombs that we would handle at that time. That is about the closest that we can come to estimating it. DR. SELLS: Let me propose that what we do is consider the problem to each assumption, because I think on one assumption to my own opinion would be quite different from what it would be on the other. MR. KALITINSKY: By the way, the problem of the ground crews would be different. Of course we will have our problems there, but it is possible to work them only short periods of time, and we can have quite involved installations to protect them because the performance of the airplane is not dependent on the radiation level of the maintenance crew; whereas it is dependent on the radiation level of the flight crew. CHAIRMAN SELLE: Your proposal, Dr. Sells, is that we consider the problem first on the basis of a few individuals being involved and then on the basis of many. 24 DR. SELLS: I think it might be stated this way, that one assumption is that you have a relatively small number of men who are selected from among operating crews about whom a great deal is known, men who have been under observation, who have competed against each other in practice missions and so forth, who are known to their flight surgeons over a long period of time, and so forth. The other is that you have a problem which is comparable to a mobilization problem, where you have a force which is larger or approaches your standing force that would be involved in this type of operation. I think that would be a completely different problem. DR. DORCUS: There is one other matter I would like to bring up here. I haven't any basis for even assuming this would prove to be the case, but nevertheless it seems to be a point that can't be entirely ignored. We have studied rather carefully some of the biological effects of radiation. I haven't run across a single study anywhere that has dealt with performance levels in radiation, and we have one minor study going now, some learning problems, with different radiation levels. I don't know what the outcome of it is going to be; but it is conceivable that even though physiological tests show no damage, there may be some fairly gross depreciation in performance levels of men. DR. SELLS: Is anxiety a variable in your study? DR. DORCUS: No. CHAIRMAN SELLE: I might state that one of our proposed projects concerns the effect of radiation on physical fitness, physiological processes. Are there any other contributions? COLONEL COONEY: Some work has been done on that by the Navy at Hunter's Point, and also on different types of exhaustion tests by groups at Oak Ridge. CHAIRMAN SELLE: Is there anything further to be added? DR. BOWMAN: Some tests of a similar nature have been done following electric shock treatment. Workers at the University of Pittsburgh found there were no detectable effects on animals, but the learning rate for rats, based on maze tests, was retarded. Nothing else seemed to be altered in capacity. So it seems to me there are possibilities of psychological effects which could only be worked out by special psychological tests and not by any of the ordinary physiological tests. CHAIRMAN SELLE: We have now discussed this sufficiently, I believe, to have a vote on the matter. 25 Dr. Sells, I am wondering whether your proposal is apt to complicate the situation. DR. SELLS: I am afraid it will CHAIRMAN SELLE: I think it might. What we are after at this moment is the opinion of the group on whether or not this is a special problem requiring special screening tests. I shall ask you to express your opinion by writing Yes or No on the slip handed you. Please sign your name so we will have a record of the vote. DR. DORCUS: Would you state specifically what we are voting on? CHAIRMAN SELLE: Yes, I will state that. Perhaps this phraseology is suitable: "Viewed in the light of other wartime hazards, does the radiation hazard represent a unique problem which requires special screening techniques?" Say Yes or No or Undecided. MR. KALITINSKY: Could we phrase that to say "A unique psychological problem?" CHAIRMAN SELLE: The psychological aspect, I think, is implied; but include "psychological." It will then be phrased: "Viewed in the light of other wartime hazards, does the radiation hazard represent a unique psychological problem which requires special screening techniques?" DR. SELLS: I would like to speak on a couple of points there. I doubt if that is phrased in a way that covers all of the discussion that we have had this morning. For example, if you face a situation such as Colonel Cooney described, I think you would have unique problem. If you clarify a number of the unknowns, you would not. I think that the question has a number of ifs and buts around it, and I find it difficult to express a clear-cut Yes or No. I would like to be corrected on that. CAPTAIN BEHRENS: There are some ifs and buts which I think could be clarified by further research and study and education. CHAIRMAN SELLE: Is there anybody else who raises that objection? LIEUTENANT WISE: I don't raise that objection, but there seems to me to be another objection. If we had pilots or crew members who were going into the air with one problem, one specific stress, and that the stress of radiation effects, I would say it is a unique problem. 26 However, the crew members are going into the air with not only radiation fears, but with fears of other similar distressing elements -- extreme altitude speeds, methods of escape from aircraft, etc. So it seems to me that this is not a unique problem, but certainly it contributes to an assemblage of stresses which makes in its total a unique problem. CHAIRMAN SELLE: Perhaps I might read the question again. "Viewed in the light of other wartime hazards, does the radiation hazard represent a unique problem which requires special screening techniques?" DR. SELLS: Dr. Selle, when we started the meeting this morning, you said, "Let's not consider what the hazard it, but what our estimate of what the soldier thinks the hazard is." That is why I brought up this point. CHAIRMAN SELLE: Are we able at this time to estimate what the soldier thinks? DR. SELLS: I think Colonel Flickinger would probably state -- correct me, if you will, Colonel -- that if there were some considerable question whether or not men would be sterile, that that would be a unique and particularly vexations problem to many men. COLONEL FLICKINGER: That is probably true. COLONEL COONEY: There is comes down again to a matter of education. Let's tell these people how much radiation they have to be subjected to sterilize them. Let's emphasis the difference between sterilization and potency. If we get that straightened out, it is all right. If we don't, it is a problem. CAPTAIN BEHRENS: There is a widespread delusion that some individuals would be sterile. There are some peculiar ideas relative to radiation that are related to primitive concepts of hysteria and things in that category. That is why I believe there is such a unique element in it; for some, it begins to border on the mysterial. That is why I think a certain amount of indoctrination is necessary even in addition to education, because in some respects this begins to transcend reason and logic. There will be a fair number of people who will not be amendable to appeals of logic, because they have developed an unreasonable fixation that it is related to magic, mysticism, spiritualism, which makes it necessary that additional screening be done. CAPTAIN TIPTON: That brings up another question about the definition of unique. Are we supposing that our enemy would not be capable of exposing ground troops to hazards that are not far more unknown? Here you have presented the problem where people would be subject to known doses of radiation. Ground troops have the hazard of being exposed to unknown doses. Does your unique include that type of differentiation? 27 CHAIRMAN SELLE: No, only with regard to the operations of the nuclear powered plane itself. CAPTAIN TIPTON: As compared to what? CHAIRMAN SELLE: Individuals who are not operating the nuclear powered planes. Is the radiation hazard a unique psychological problem for the crew of the nuclear propelled aircraft? DR. DORCUS: Would it be fair to state this: "Are there some special problems associated with this situation that should be investigated?" CHAIRMAN SELLE: Will you re-state that? DR. DORCUS: I said, "Are there some special problems associated with this general area that should be investigated?" CHAIRMAN SELLE: Rather than phrasing it as a unique problem? DR. DORCUS: I was trying to resolve this word "unique" here which is giving people difficulty. DR. BOWMAN: Isn't it true that every problem you have has a certain uniqueness about it? Take the problem of bacterial warfare and of use of various toxins, and a whole series of different things. Each one has certain unique problems; but you are raising this question whether this has unique problems which apply to the selection of personnel who are to run nuclear powered planes. Isn't that the specific question you are making? CHAIRMAN SELLE: That is right. MR. KALITINSKY: Maybe this might cast some light. I would like to hear some comments as to how this would compare with the situation that we are confronted with at the present time in the A-bomb crews. If you look at it from a point of view of the ignorance of the laymen, aren't they faced with pretty much the same problem? It doesn't happen to be the power plan of the airplane, but they are still carrying this extremely mysterious and lethal gadget around. What is the experience there? And would this problem be materially different from that problem? That is, to put it from a practical point of view, should we develop selection tests that are any different from those that have to be used to select A- bomb crews for conventionally powered airplanes? COLONEL BLOUNT: I think you will have to have selection of personnel for highly specialized aircraft. I am definitely convinced of that. DR. SELLS: It is not only selection. I think if you want to broaden your questions: "Are there any problems involved with regard to personnel for this type of aircraft that are different from those for comparable missions?" That would include the education problem, too. 28 COLONEL COONEY: Of course, you don't have any radiological problems with the A-bomb. You could hardly compare the two. DR. SELLS: That would bring up one additional problem. CHAIRMAN SELLE: We are being led astray. I would like first to have you vote on the question itself, whether or not it is properly phrased if it is not, we will re-phrase it so that everyone is satisfied. Let me read it once more; then we will have a vote of hands to learn whether or not the question seems proper: "Viewed in the light of other wartime hazards, does the radiation hazard represent a unique psychological problem which requires special screening techniques?" May I see the hands of those who feel that this adequately covers the situation which we have been discussing? All those who approve of this particular phraseology, may we see your hands, please? (Counting) Nine. All right. And now those who disapprove of that phraseology? (Counting) Well, our opposition has completely broken down. There seems to be no one now who objects to the phraseology. Then, if it is agreeable, we shall vote on the question as stated. Will you please do so, sign your name, and let us have the returns. It is obvious that there is much left to be considered, even though the vote may not be in favor of a special or unique problem. Do you think that even though the decision is against a unique problem being present, some attempt should be made in the usual methods of screening to take care of the radiation hazard on the basis of it being another anxiety factor? Dr. Sells, what are your thoughts on this? DR. SELLS: I think the remarks that have been made concerning educational indoctrination are extremely important, and what is done there will undoubtedly have a great deal of bearing on subsequent developments. That would be my first comment. My second comment is that with regard to selection of personnel I think it is very largely a question of whether we have a large numbers of not. Apparently, from everything I have been able to figure out and what others have said, anxiety tolerance and perhaps management of anxiety as a separate problem are the most significant and outstanding elements; and I think that if we can select a A team from the men we have, special education devices will probably not be required. However, if we have larger numbers of men or if we look ahead in selecting cadets at the beginning of the training with a view of developing men for our air force who will be superior, then I think that there is a place for consideration of such factors in our regular screening program. 29 I think that the weight given to these factors is different. I think however, that we cannot try to pick men who simply excel in one particular aspect. Motivation, as Dr. Bowman has mentioned, is perhaps the most important of all, once we get over the basic aptitudes and skills. Leadership is important. A man who is an aircraft commander on a ship that has a crew of eight or ten or perhaps twenty or thirty men has to be a different kind of individual from one who flies an airplane by himself. We have to consider those things. So I feel that it is hard to make general statements about a problem like this. We have to formulate a specific problem; and when we get down to it, we should be in position to handle it if we continue with our general research on related problems to a point where our instruments are sharp enough and we formulate the specific things we have to do. We are not ready to face this problem now because we don't know enough abut it. CHAIRMAN SELLE: Possibly by the time the pilots are actually needed we will have more physiological data to fill in the gaps existing in our present tabulated data. DR. DORCUS: I would like to comment on one remark that Dr. Selle raised here, whether we can assume that there is a general anxiety problem, or whether anxieties are generated our of specific areas. The question whether the specific anxiety of a particular nature will affect one man more than it will affect another man may seem to be open to some question. It seems to me that it is in that specific area that this does suggest a unique problem. DR. BOWMAN: I would think that that point might well be raised about the question of sterility, for example, that some people are going to be much more affected by that than others. That is based on a whole set of factors; some of which are open to change without any question about some of which are not. The thing that one man is afraid of it a result of his whole life training and experience and is not necessarily the thing which another man is afraid of or develops anxiety toward. Here we have built up in the minds of most people a very special sort of anxiety. I would like to raise one question I heard brought up; it concerns the public. Criticism has been made that if you get the public to believing that there isn't much to fear from the atomic bomb, then you have destroyed some of our threat to others whom we wan to intimidate. When Drew Pearson came out with a statement about treatment for atomic bombing, making it rather simple, there were a number of persons who were tremendously upset by the statement. They felt that the psychological effect would be bad, because we would no longer be able to bluff or threaten other nations with the atomic bomb. I don't know whether that is a question you want to consider here or not, but it is one that has been raised. If we are going to desensitize our own population to the dangers of the bomb, we presumably are going to desensitize other peoples. 30 COLONEL COONEY: I don't see how our people can possibly assume that attitude. After all, we know that the two weapons killed about 100,000 people in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It is a very bad weapon, and I think that anybody who assumes that it isn't is just evading the problem. DR. BOWMAN: I would agree with you; I raised the point because I heard from two or three sources that since Drew Pearson's article some people were greatly disturbed. I thought you might want to consider that point. DR. SELLS: I doubt if it had a bearing on our particular problem. COLONEL COONEY: Isn't it a matter of how we can educate an individual, how we can lay facts before him? I notice here under 25 r we say, "delayed effects possible but highly improbable." Now, there is more chance of one of us going home tonight and getting poliomyelitis than there is of anybody having delayed effects at 25 r. None of us is worrying about going home tonight; that is, we are not under a state of tension about going home and being affected by poliomyelitis. Again, the law of probability, I think, is the big thing; can we get it across to an individual? CAPTAIN BEHRENS: The prevalence of this gross misconception, ignorance and the long time it takes for education to become effective is the reasons that the radiological effects are over estimated. That is one of the reasons I think we have certain unique elements to contend with. It takes so long for education to come up to people. If you take a group, there will always be a statistical possibility -- how great, it is I don't know -- that a certain number of individuals may have an unreasonable fear about radiations. That might be a factor in selection. COLONEL COONEY: You see, we have overstressed radiation so much and understressed the other hazards of the bomb. How are we going to take care of 50,000 thermal burns in a day? That is a problem in itself which would over-extend your most vivid imagination, and yet nobody talks about that, and most people think of this bomb as purely a radiation bomb. Here again it is not only the nuclear radiation you are going to have in this airplane, but other hazards as well. Yet I will bet your pilots are more frightened by the radiation hazard than they are of the decompression one. Are they, or are they not? COLONEL FLICKINGER: I wouldn't be prepared to answer that, Colonel. MR. COWEN: Colonel Cooney, I would like to ask a question. When these two bombs were used in warfare over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, how much selection and indoctrination was given the crews that delivered the bombs? 31 COLONEL COONEY: They had considerable indoctrination; but again, about all they knew about it was that it was a big bomb of some sort. They didn't have any idea of what type of hazard was associated with it. I think the pilot's remark, as reported in the long when the bomb was dropped; was, "Oh, my God," or something to that effect. MR. COWEN: Then it was almost total ignorance? COLONEL COONEY: I believe so. COLONEL FLICKINGER: Colonel Cooney, the only way I could answer your question in this manner. If all of the other physical threats to the air crew were largely eliminated, then I think that the radiation hazard would be uppermost. But at the present time, at least, in our present state of operations, even when they have simulated missions now, they worry about such things as high-speed escape and explosive decompression than they do about the radiation hazard. But the average air crewman knows so little about radiation. As I wrote Dr. Selle in a letter, some of the officers came to me and asked me if it was true that they would become sterile from looking at the radar scope over a long period of time. So their general level of information of such things is very low. COLONEL COONEY: I think Dr. Bowman's question is well taken. As a matter of fact, it disturbed me a great deal before we started talking about this thing. At Eniwetok I went to some of the higher authorities of the armed forces and asked them about that specific point. Perhaps we might well divide our means of indoctrination. But with the civilians on one hand and the military on the other, I am convinced that we as fighting men must instill courage in the fighting man. As to whether or not we should instill fear for the purpose of having to affect the enemy or not, and the general public, I wouldn't know. CHAIRMAN SELLE: We have the returns now from the vote. There were 4 who were undecided. They didn't state category Yes or No. There were 7 who voted No, and 3 Yes. Are we to assume then that an educational program will minimize the radiation hazard to such an extent that it would not be necessary to plan special screening tests for evaluating the psychological impact of the risk? Can we assume that to be correct? COMMANDER CHAMBERS: That is the thing I was thinking of, the unique problem of our educational program. What does the probability mean to the crew member? When we tell an individual there is a probability of a certain value that he will be injured, is he able to grasp exactly what that means. If he hasn't enough background to know fully what it means, he is worse off then if he didn't know anything about it. 32 CHAIRMAN SELLE: We can assume, I am certain, that the Air Force, whoever uses these planes, will indoctrinate the men as thoroughly as possible in carrying out their duties properly in face of the threat of this hazard. There may be contrary views with respect to this; would we hear from other members relative to this. DR. BOWMAN: I have the feeling that by this vote we said that we do not see a unique problem at the present time, but that that should not mean that further study should not be done or that there is no possibility that there may be a unique problem, and that further study along these lines should be made to see whether something unique can be uncovered. This is merely a statement that in our present state of knowledge, with the information we have, we don't see a unique problem here or any need for specific screening tests for personnel. But it is possible there is; we just don't know enough about it as yet. I don't think we should discuss the problem as completely settled. CHAIRMAN SELLE: That, I think, is an excellent summarizing statement of the proceedings so far and takes us into the second phase of our discussion. If later on there appears to be need for special work, who would seem to be the logical group to do it? Is there any group besides the one at Randolph Field who may be interested in the problem and who may be able to carry on needed research? CAPTAIN BEHRENS: We have such work in mind, but what we do depends on appropriations. Admiral Parsons is very much concerned about the psychological aspects; and if we can get funds, we hope to set up some studies. Just what lines such work would take would depend, of course, upon the personnel we get and their particular interests and views. For studies of the general problem of the psychological aspects of atomic warfare, we hope to get some funds. CHAIRMAN SELLE: May I ask if the A.E.C. is contemplating any psychological studies that would have a bearing on this? DR. TUTTLE: We are getting involved in that largely because of our liaison with the National Security Resources Board in civil defense work. Participating on a small scale with their larger contributions are the Army and Navy. The problem involved there is one of indoctrination of a limited group of people who would have to go into a devastated area and do rescue work, as well as determine the levels. So we are interested in it. I don't believe any specific projects have been contemplated at this time. CHAIRMAN SELLE: Would anyone care to make a statement as to what the probable cost of such a program would be? It would have to be a rough estimate, indeed. Would it be much of an idea at Randolph Field to carry on research of this nature? 33 DR. SELLS: I would like to state first that we are not doing any research in relation to radiation at the present time. We are studying methods of screening with regard to personality variables. Now it may be that the problem involved here is simply a question of differential weight on certain aspects of personality that may be more crucial in this type of situation. However, I think that the opinions expressed here today might very well be followed up, as studying various groups of personnel in laboratories of the Atomic Energy Commission in order to determine whether certain types of personnel problems are arising there that might throw further light on this problem and reinforce the opinions that have been expressed today. Now, if a specific project like that were considered, I think you might be able to speculate on cost. But as to anything that we might do, it would be a question of whether we go into specific groups and work with them or whether it is simply a matter of making available results of our research with cadets and pilots to their applications. If that were done, I don't see any additional cost. If we studied different populations, then it would be a question of how much work is done and whether our present staff could handle it or whether we would have to get additional staff for the purpose. At present we would have to get additional staff; and if the population tested and the follow-up studies done were of the same general size, it would not be a very expensive undertaking. DR. DORCUS: I think that somewhere along the line people who have either ILLEGIBLE or otherwise been exposed to certain amounts of radiation should be completely studied from a psychological angle. I ILLEGIBLE from your remark earlier that that possibly was being done at Randolph Field. It seems to me that research groups are overlooking a very important thing in failing to accumulate information in this angle field. DR. SELLS: I think that is a very important problem. It is not within the scope of your present mission. We haven't gone into it. CHAIRMAN SELLE: Are there any further comments? MR. KALITINSKY: I was debating whether what we actually got in the sampling of opinion doesn't show that we should ask another question. I get the impression that maybe the consensus of opinion is -- "I don't know; I am just trying to analyze it" --- that although right now we can't put our finger on anything unique about this problem; there might be a number of people here who feel that there are enough unknowns so that they would warrant some further study on the subject. COLONEL COONEY: I think so very definitely. I don't feel that the atomic energy plant would be a good place to study the problem because I don't believe you can make any comparison there at all. There you have people who know the problems of the agency. You talk to the average soldier or officer about a health hazard and he doesn't have any idea what you are talking about. 34 I might say I know of two cases that received large doses of radiation, and the psychological reaction between the two of them was just as different as day and night. The one who had the larger dose, and he had a very large dose, just never thinks about it. He goes about this work and has dismissed it entirely. The other is practically an invalid. DR. BOWMAN: Isn't that the same about all types of hazards, that your problem is really comparable to other hazards? I know some people with in operable cancer who are just going psychotic over the whole thing, and other who are relatively unconcerned. So we have that same thing in all other hazards. I don't see that is a unique reaction toward radiation at all. It is simply the same reaction that people express toward other hazards. DR. DORCUS: When I made my comment here a moment ago, I was thinking not so much about the disturbance resulting from exposure of a psychological nature, but rather the actual possible deficiencies in sub-ILLEGIBLE performance of life of the individual. That might be involved. DR. BOWMAN: Yes, I would agree with you entirely with what you have said that that type of study should be made. MR. KALITINSKY: Isn't there a subtle difference here that we have to consider. Let's compare it to the ejection seat. There psychological ILLEGIBLE afraid that something will go wrong and he will break a leg ILLEGIBLE at once. ILLEGIBLE faced with the problem of being exposed for a certain period of time to radiation. If he gets properly indoctrinated, he will then ILLEGIBLE might have to wait ten or twenty years and then have some ILLEGIBLE to him. DR. BOWMAN: You have that with a number of diseases. I was in Canton, ILLEGIBLE years ago last fall and was bitten up badly by mosquitoes. ILLEGIBLE hell, you will have to wait at least six months before ILLEGIBLE whether you are going to get malaria; you will not know until ILLEGIBLE next spring or summer." You have that unknown factor in all sorts of diseases and with accidents and injuries. You are a patient with a head injury, and you don't know for two or ILLEGIBLE perhaps how extensive and intensive the injury really is, ILLEGIBLE whether he is going to show a gradual recovery curve or a downhill ILLEGIBLE what is going to happen. Again, it seems to me that is not really unique in radiation exposure. You can duplicate it with other conditions, and the knowledge we have about these applies here and we simply bring it over. MR. KALITINSKY: I wasn't thinking so much of it being unique in a ILLEGIBLE general view, but it being markedly different from the type of hazard that is normally considered for aircraft crews; that is, violent action. DR. BOWMAN: There is no question about that. 35 CAPTAIN BEHRENS: People who have seen sensitized to this type of thing are more vulnerable to it. You have a unique problem sometime and it takes quite a few years before education catches up on it. DR. BOWMAN: I think in that sense it is unique. CAPTAIN BEHRENS: That is what I mean. People who are not informed and are sensitized to it are not entirely reasonable about it. They won't rationalize that hazard as they do other perils; that is what makes it unique. It takes time for education to catch up. CHAIRMAN SELLE: I would like to take advantage of the presence of our especially invited guests to ask what they think we might do, in light of the opinion expressed by this group today, toward further consideration of the problem. We will probably adjourn in a few minutes, but I shall ask the regular committee to meet again this afternoon. Before adjourning, I would like to have Colonel Cooney and others suggest recommendations which this committee might make as a follow-up to our present deliberations. Colonel Cooney? COLONEL COONEY: I certainly think a lot of work should be done. As to just the type, I am not clear. Work might be done to determine whether this is a unique problem or whether individuals are going to react psychologically against something that cannot be seen. CHAIRMAN SELLE: Despite the vote, we shouldn't consider the matter settled? COLONEL COONEY: No, very definitely not. CHAIRMAN SELLE: How about you, Colonel Blount? COLONEL BLOUNT: I have nothing to add to that. CHAIRMAN SELLE: You agree with that, do you? COLONEL BLOUNT: I think so. CHAIRMAN SELLE: How about you, Captain Behrens? Do you have suggestions to add? CAPTAIN BEHRENS: Along the same line. I think it would be helpful if the committee would give its blessing on that particular aspect. More studies are in order along all psychological lines to give support to the contention that there is or is not a special problem involved. CHAIRMAN SELLE: Does anybody else wish to comment on this matter - suggestions for the future? COMMANDER CHAMBERS: If I understand the question correctly, it is whether or not you want to pursue work on the psychological effects on this particular hazard. Offhand, it is difficult for me to see. 36 How you can make any psychological studies on people without having them exposed to radiation, or at least thinking they are exposed to radiation. I feel that the most appropriate work that can be done in this field is that which clarifies to a better degree what actually will happen when a man is exposed to radiation, rather than what he thinks is going to happen. I don't think you can separate the two. If you anticipate any psychological studies, these should be made in very close conjunction with physiological, biological and medical studies. They all should be made at the same time. CHAIRMAN SELLE: We do have a comprehensive program on physiological effects planned. Dr. Tuttle, what suggestions do you have? DR. TUTTLE: I simply reiterate Colonel Cooney's suggestion that calls for further study. CHAIRMAN SELLE: Colonel DeBaun? COLONEL DeBAUN: No further comment. I think our vote may be rather significant, if you think of those No's as a trend. You got 7 No's ILLEGIBLE which more or less balance it; and perhaps we need to go on ILLEGIBLE and conduct further investigation to clear it up. CHAIRMAN SELLE: Thank you. MR. KALITINSKY: Would it be appropriate to take another vote on a ILLEGIBLE something like this: "Do you feel that further investigation to determine whether this is a unique condition is warranted?" ILLEGIBLE the first vote, maybe this would be appropriate. CHAIRMAN SELLE: I think it is. COLONEL FLICKINGER: May I amplify something you said a while ago in ILLEGIBLE straightened in my own mind? As a flight surgeon of an air ILLEGIBLE faced with the necessity of reducing the adverse psychological facts in the air crews, I do not look upon this particular potential hazard as presenting a qualitatively different ILLEGIBLE but a unique problem from the standpoint of reducing the psychological impact of that threat to security of the crew. I would like to continue by saying that I would be very anxious to get help from various members of the committee on methods of attacking ILLEGIBLE particular anxieties are uncovered in a further estimate of this potential hazard. I don't know whether that clarifies the atmosphere as far as the practical implication of this problem is concerned. I may know how to take some of their fear of seat ejection, or their fear of flying 55,000 feet. I am not at all sure what their fears are in regards to radiation once I uncover them, I don't know exactly what I am going to do about them. In that respect, I certainly think it is a unique problem. 37 DR. BOWMAN: That is a very different problem from the problem of selection of personnel, which is what we voted on before. I would agree with everything that was said there. I think some type of questionnaire study might be worked out for personnel of atomic energy plants to get the first point, what they really think about the hazard and what their ideas are; and then how much that approximates the facts as we know them. That would be one of the first things to start with. CHAIRMAN SELLE: I think this suggestion might be stated in the form of a motion, which will carry with it a recommendation. Mr. Bowman, I think that was very well stated, and I would like to add one footnote to it. That is, than when that is done, it may reopen the personnel question. COLONEL DeBAUN: Are you going to apply that specifically to NEPA aircraft? MR. KALITINSKY: That is right. DR. BOWMAN: (Reading) "Do you feel that further investigation to determine whether radiation introduces a special psychological problem is warranted?" DR. BOWMAN: To personnel of NEPA aircraft." CAPTAIN BEHRENS: I think that perhaps is understood. Whether you ILLEGIBLE it in or not is the question. CHAIRMAN SELLE: This is a subcommittee on the Psychological Problems of ILLEGIBLE Selection Relative to Radiation Hazards, which is a subcommittee of the NEPA Advisory Committee; so that is assumed. Are there any objections to that phraseology here? DR. SELLS: I think that any change in terminology would be in the form of ILLEGIBLE; but I should assume that what is implied is significant problems. And in the spirit of what Colonel Flickinger said, is whether there are some significant problems here; whether they are special or new for whether they are similar to something that went ILLEGIBLE is not so much an issue really as whether it is something we have to do something about. That is what was troubling you about "unique" before, I think. CHAIRMAN SELLE: The results of the vote will be regarded by the committee as a recommendation. Perhaps we are now ready to vote on this second discussion. (Ballots were passed out.) Before we adjourn, does anyone have anything further to contribution. COMMANDER CHAMBERS: I would like to ask one question from a physicist point of view along this whole line. What are the possibilities 38 of accidents? Are you prepared to make a statement on that? What is the possibility of an unusual situation as far as radiological ILLEGIBLE ? CHAIRMAN SELLE: Do you refer to the possibility of something occurring to the shielding on to a smashup? COMMANDER CHAMBERS: In general, yes, anything that might happen to the power plane as a whole that might create an unusual radiological hazard. MR. KALITINSKY: I don't think we can really guess at that. We never ILLEGIBLE. I think there will always be the possibility of a crackup as ILLEGIBLE. I think one thing that has to be considered is that there might be a ILLEGIBLE of crews, or there might be some difficulty where the commander might be out in a position of wanting to use the same crew several times in quick succession, where the crew members would be coming pretty close to the danger level. He might want to send them on five consecutive missions of 10 r of 24 hours each, spaced a day apart. ILLEGIBLE a problem under wartime conditions. CHAIRMAN SELLE: We can now give the returns of the last vote. Of the 14 individuals expressing an opinion, everybody voted Yes. So it is certain that the subject will be considered again in the future. The committee will not be dismissed at this tim.e Is there anything else? (There was no response.) We certainly are ILLEGIBLE to you for helping us on this problem. We shall probably ILLEGIBLE many of you for further assistance. If we in turn can be ILLEGIBLE to you, please call upon us. Thanks again for you helpful comments and suggestions. May I remind members of the regular committee that we will meet ILLEGIBLE. (ILLEGIBLE at 11:45 a.m., the committee recessed until 1:45 p.m.) 39 AFTERNOON SESSION (1:45 p.m.) CHAIRMAN SELLE: Gentlemen, this morning's meeting was very interesting and very helpful. Because of it we were able to discharge the first of our objectives to arrive at some understanding of the complexity of the problem. Nevertheless, it left us, I am afraid, in a vacuum. I think that this afternoon we might try to fill in with something more concrete. In an attempt to evaluate this morning's accomplishments, I hope you will ILLEGIBLE me on the following statement. It was the general consensus that at the moment we are adequately indoctrinated, the radiation hazard, when assess with other wartime hazards, does not represent a special or unique psychological problem. The vote on that, you will recall, was 7 Yeses, 5 Nos, and 4 were undecided. DR. SELLS: I think that statement should be qualified in terms of selection. That point came up several times, and I think we should note that again. CHAIRMAN SELLE: This conference was called for consideration of the psychological problem of crew selection. But accepting your suggestion, the group this morning did not feel that the radiation hazard represents a special psychological problem in the selection of the crew for nuclear propelled aircraft. It did now determine from you gentlemen this morning what your own votes were, after all the NEPA Advisory Committee recommended that we secure the ILLEGIBLE of qualified psychologists in assessing this problem. I would like to know now whether the vote of the large group reflects the view of the psychologists. Dr. Sells, how did you vote on that this morning? DR. SELLS: This morning I wrote "Uncertain; probably No." At this ILLEGIBLE , we have resolved the problem more particularly in terms of selection. I would say that I would still maintain the same position, because I think that as the problems of adjustment are further explored, there ILLEGIBLE selection problem; and then again there might no. So I would maintain the same position. CHAIRMAN SELLE: Colonel Flickinger? COLONEL FLICKINGER: I voted no on that, as far as selection of personnel was concerned, it doesn't constitute a problem. CHAIRMAN SELLE: Dr. Dorcus? DR. DORCUS: I voted Yes; but I would like to explain my reasons for it. I don't think it makes any real difference whether the plane is powered ILLEGIBLE when it comes down to that. I do think that there is certain aspects of the problem that need some exploration before we say there is not selection problem involved. It was on that basis that I voted Yes. 40 DR. SELLS: We are probably together on that. DR. DORCUS: The thing that is important, it seems to me, is the ILLEGIBLE delayed effects and whether we have actually discovered ILLEGIBLE all of the effects of radiation on the human organism. That the point I am not sure about at the present tim.e CHAIRMAN SELLE: I am certain that no one would state that we have ILLEGIBLE all of the effects of radiation on man. DR. DORCUS: The second point is whether or not there may be performance ILLEGIBLE results from smaller degrees of radiation which have ILLEGIBLE biologically. To think there are certain angles from which this might be approached ILLEGIBLE selection basis, in picking up certain factors that would ten ILLEGIBLE and indoctrination procedure for people involved in this ILLEGIBLE . ILLEGIBLE the considerations that were involved in my thinking. CHAIRMAN SELLE: Dr. Bowman? DR. BOWMAN: I voted No, meaning by that I could see no specific ILLEGIBLE problems in selection that anybody had brought up. ILLEGIBLE was said by others, I had the feeling that there should ILLEGIBLE of the whole problem. But I couldn't see that ILLEGIBLE evidence for requiring special procedures in the ILLEGIBLE see persons beyond those operating a conventionally ILLEGIBLE. ILLEGIBLE any evidence that crewman of the nuclear propelled ship ILLEGIBLE in any way. CHAIRMAN SELLE: You will recall that it was felt by everyone that ILLEGIBLE should be made to obtain more information to strengthen ILLEGIBLE as expressed. However, little was suggested in recommending ILLEGIBLE substantiating the view. It seems to me that we might spend ILLEGIBLE attempting to do so this afternoon. ILLEGIBLE proceed to improve the stand we took this morning? What ILLEGIBLE be? Several general statements were made this ILLEGIBLE very specific was offered. Some of you have been ILLEGIBLE about this during the noon recess and possibly have some ILLEGIBLE to make now which you did not have this morning. DR. DORCUS: I would like to make a statement or two here. Dr. Bowman points out this morning that one way to partly get information on the problem, particularly on indoctrination, would be to obtain information from groups who are scientifically informed about the effects of radiation as compared with those who are relatively uninformed about the effects and actually get information about the hazards and sources of anxiety ILLEGIBLE in those two different groups. Are they different? Does technical information actually lessen that tension producing effect? It seems to me that would be at least one ILLEGIBLE points in this whole procedure. 41 CHAIRMAN SELLE: In other words, how effective is the educational ILLEGIBLE in minimizing the radiation hazard as an anxiety factor? DR. DORCUS: Either an educational program or actual possession of ILLEGIBLE knowledge about the effects. CHAIRMAN SELLE: I think we can assume that there will be a rather ILLEGIBLE in indoctrination. Would it be possible to evaluate ILLEGIBLE of the educational programs? DR. DORCUS: I should think that would be a possibility in the air ILLEGIBLE. As a matter of fact, I wasn't thinking particularly in ILLEGIBLE stages of lifting it to the air force group, but actually ILLEGIBLE from workers who have been working in ILLEGIBLE and a nuclear physics setup, and compare ILLEGIBLE on problems related to it as compared with people who ILLEGIBLE similar educational background but who actually ILLEGIBLE contact with the field. ILLEGIBLE: I think the design at the level of expressed opinions and ILLEGIBLE personality mechanisms could be worked out. Also it might ILLEGIBLE follow-up on that a bit, to take individuals whom you ILLEGIBLE to it so that their acquaintanceship with it could be ILLEGIBLE controlled. That might be considered. ILLEGIBLE Colonel Flickinger might have a group which is being ILLEGIBLE that this time so that their knowledge preceding ILLEGIBLE can be studied and changes that take place as the ILLEGIBLE. DR. DORCUS: ILLEGIBLE thinking so much of the specific design of the ILLEGIBLE we are trying to get at. CHAIRMAN SELLE: There is one question which has been asked of me on ILLEGIBLE and I considered presenting it this morning but ILLEGIBLE would save it for this afternoon. It is this: ILLEGIBLE and other crew members have complete information on ILLEGIBLE exposure; in other words, should they be told of the ILLEGIBLE to and during the mission? DR. BOWMAN: I don't believe you can keep it from them; and I think ILLEGIBLE people from knowing what is going on, you usually ILLEGIBLE getting misinformation which will be more harmful than ILLEGIBLE will develop, I think, all sorts of fantastic ideas ILLEGIBLE withholding information will do much more harm ILLEGIBLE knowledge of the facts. CHAIRMAN SELLE: That was my own conclusion, but I wanted to learn what you gentlemen thought about it. DR. SELLS: I certainly will agree with that. DR. DORCUS: I will agree with that. COLONEL FLICKINGER: I will, too. 42 DR. SELLS: That is the psychological interpretation. It is also a question of policy and ethnics which, as a group of psychologists, we would not consider otherwise. CHAIRMAN SELLE: I would like to get back to the question of manpower estimated cost, time, and so on for research. We can't have a clear idea, of course, of the requirements until we develop a better idea of the specific research desired and the procedures necessary. But one of the requests made by the Advisory Committee at our last meeting was that we try to find out what the projected research means in terms of manpower, money, and time. I don't know whether anything more can be added to what was said this morning, since the program is very indefinite. But it seems to me that it wouldn't be an expensive item if the work were carried on in the proper military installation such as Randolph Field. COLONEL FLICKINGER: I don't think the cost would run very high, Dr. Sells; at least as I visualized the problem within my own command. For instance, I think that with the advice of some of the other members of the committee, I could carry out certain personal interviews and distribute questionnaires to give us a preliminary estimate of what the problem might involve; then if it did require further mechanisms on the ILLEGIBLE of Dr. Sells and his group at Randolph, it would mostly be a question of trained personnel. DR. SELLS: However, it is one thing to think of some exploratory research, such as finding out what problems seem to bother people and what is the content of their thoughts and their emotional feelings about this -- and another thing to evaluate the anxiety factor associated with aircraft propelled by atomic energy. How are we going to interview people about that when they don't even know there are such aircraft under consideration? COLONEL FLICKINGER: Of course, that is a narrow application of my general problem, which I think can be answered in the same way I will answer my problem. In other words, as Colonel Cooney pointed out, ordinarily our crews don't think of being exposed to radiation. But certainly in the operational planning of missions, one has to consider, and I am sure the crews do consider, the possibility of flying through a radioactive cloud while following aircraft that have already dropped the bombs, or the possibility of landing in a radioactive area during a material failure. Finally, the thing I have to consider is the question of rescue, pickup of crews that have landed in radioactive areas. I may be completely wrong, Dr. Selle, but I think that in the process of evaluating the potentiality of that particular psychological stress on my air crew and figuring out the best method of indoctrination, I would come up with an answer that would help the NEPA Project. 43 DR. SELLS: It is very similar to something we have all done or seen. We ILLEGIBLE and give questionnaires or interview pilots about flying ILLEGIBLE. Would you continue to fly without flying pay?" You get a very high ILLEGIBLE of No. Very few say they would, and many of them are psychopathic. ILLEGIBLE of them say "No." But if you actually withdrew flying pay, I ILLEGIBLE to say that 60 to 70 percent would continue to fly; maybe more ILLEGIBLE opinion. ILLEGIBLE this problem now. We can apply that by analogy to this situation. I think that if we interview people on hypothetical problems and get their opinions, we are not getting their feelings or their ILLEGIBLE when they are actually projected into the situation. It is possible perhaps to contrive situations or perhaps to go to other personnel who are working with radiation who are not flying and look for ILLEGIBLE the underlying disturbances, and then possibly bring it into ILLEGIBLE. But your whole point make sense, and I agree with it; I am not prepared, ILLEGIBLE completely with the predication that interviewing people ILLEGIBLE basis would actually give you definite information conILLEGIBLE behavior. COLONEL FLICKINGER: Granted, except that I wasn't thinking of trying to ILLEGIBLE of the basis of questionnaires and interviews as much ILLEGIBLE to evaluate basic understanding of the stress inILLEGIBLE simply their opinion of what is involved in exposure ILLEGIBLE in so far as their own health and well-being are concerned. CHAIRMAN SELLE: I am not clear on one or two matters. Do I understand ILLEGIBLE that you, Dr. Sells, could do immediately with ILLEGIBLE this problem? DR. SELLS: ILLEGIBLE facilities for doing research. Frankly, at this ILLEGIBLE a research project where we can immediately ILLEGIBLE certain conditions of the investigation aren't ILLEGIBLE. ILLEGIBLE the staff, interviewing techniques, a good ILLEGIBLE evaluating personnel and provisions for analyzing ILLEGIBLE things I have been talking about the past ILLEGIBLE a block, and I can't get past them very easily. DR. BOWMAN: I would like to ask a question. Perhaps this isn't a proper question, and it may get over into secret material. Is there any factors for nuclear propelled planes ready now which would be used for research, or it this all something in the future? CHAIRMAN SELLE: It is pretty much in the future. But perhaps Mr. Kalitinsky will talk on that. MR. KALITINSKY: Yes, I think that is the answer. 44 DR. BOWMAN: Can you get a reactor somewhere and get some people working around it, then discuss with them the exposure level at the moment and ILLEGIBLE psychological reactions? MR. KALITINSKY: Of course, there are nuclear reactors in operation, and ILLEGIBLE operations around a nuclear reactor involve exposure to high ILLEGIBLE radiation for a short tim.e You see, there is always this time dependence. Actually it could always be ILLEGIBLE any subjects could be brought into a pile and given ILLEGIBLE that involves actually no harm to them at all, because they ILLEGIBLE their permissible dose in a short time instead of a long time. But I think we pointed out to them that they are in a field of radiatic ILLEGIBLE dangerous if they remain in it for a long time. That can be ILLEGIBLE practical experiment. DR. BOWMAN: I was thinking there might be a way of working out something ILLEGIBLE all group and discuss with them before they go in ILLEGIBLE reactions; and then indoctrinate them and have them ILLEGIBLE the exposure, and afterwards discuss with them their ILLEGIBLE might indicate how well they came through and whether ILLEGIBLE themselves of unusual or abnormal anxieties and tensions ILLEGIBLE whether some of them were still concerned. ILLEGIBLE: That appeals to me in still another way. I think that one ILLEGIBLE about stemming anxiety in the laboratory is that we ILLEGIBLE contrive realistic and adequate situations to produce ILLEGIBLE this might have additional advantage of providing an ILLEGIBLE where such studies could be made. CHAIRMAN SELLE: As to education of the crew, do you believe that different ILLEGIBLE indoctrination, with varied emphasis, might be desirable ILLEGIBLE members of the crew? COLONEL FLICKINGER: I think we will find different levels of indoctrination ILLEGIBLE important. I must not only obtain a base line ILLEGIBLE the airplane commanders and then the enlisted air ILLEGIBLE. DR. SELLS: That is a good point. You are talking about their knowledge. ILLEGIBLE climate of feeling and opinion about this problem. COLONEL FLICKINGER: That is right. I want to know how he looks upon ILLEGIBLE especially during these periods of time when they don't know ILLEGIBLE what they are carrying. ILLEGIBLE: Isn't a lot of the information we are asking for available at the Atomic Energy Commission? After all, when they start reILLEGIBLE go out and select personnel. CHAIRMAN SELLE: I don't believe they consider the job from the psychological angle at all. MR. KALITINSKY: I don't think so either. 45 MR. KAUFFMAN: You don't think they ever have? MR. KALITINSKY: The basic philosophy at Argonne, a research laboratory, might be ILLEGIBLE. Argonne has none of the production aspects of Oak Ridge ILLEGIBLE. Their attitude is that all they should do is post the danger, not inform of danger, but in terms of radiation levels. ILLEGIBLE everybody who works here is competent. They are professional ILLEGIBLE means and it is up to them." All they say basically interested in is making sure that everybody knows ILLEGIBLE radiation. Every time a reactor is started up -- and we ILLEGIBLE been very often -- the people who operate it are the ILLEGIBLE designed it. They are all high- level specialists. They all ILLEGIBLE doing. I don't think they consider any psychological ILLEGIBLE. ILLEGIBLE: That is what Colonel Cooney was saying this morning. MR. KALITINSKY: I know one example of the kind of thing that is being ILLEGIBLE they have medical examinations that involve X- ray, ILLEGIBLE are given extremely strict orders not to answer ILLEGIBLE with regard to the amount of roentgens that the X-ray ILLEGIBLE labor reactions. Everybody is very much conILLEGIBLE they all ask then they get X-rays. That is a ILLEGIBLE. CHAIRMAN SELLE: Someone referred before to the value of reward. Should ILLEGIBLE some into the picture in any way as incentives to ILLEGIBLE selection of crewmen? DR. DORCUS: This is part of the motivation problem. Incidentally, ILLEGIBLE different when grappling with the enemy in wartime ILLEGIBLE. DR. BOWMAN: You mean, for example, added pay? COLONEL FLICKINGER: Extra hazard pay. That is one thing, Dr. Sells ILLEGIBLE thought to recently, because it seems now as though ILLEGIBLE in military aviation where we actually have ILLEGIBLE flying, the so-called "commercial" type, which ILLEGIBLE everything except our high performance ILLEGIBLE and our actual operational flying. ILLEGIBLE performance capabilities of our current tactical types ILLEGIBLE perhaps to make these differences much greater than ILLEGIBLE. In other words, even during the last ILLEGIBLE performance of B-17 or B-24 and a cargo plane ILLEGIBLE as not too great, if you exclude the extra-heavy ILLEGIBLE bombed, fully-gassed ship -- at take-off. Do the differences actually were in exposure to the enemy insofar as ILLEGIBLE. But even now, in peacetime, we have this big ILLEGIBLE in stress according to the tactical performance ILLEGIBLE. I have been wondering whether or not the ILLEGIBLE would not be required even prior to the development of NEPA, ILLEGIBLE object to separate their hazard pay into those ILLEGIBLE contemporary type operational aircraft, and those ILLEGIBLE to routine flying. 46 CHAIRMAN SELLE: Would not that in itself emphasize the risk and work ILLEGIBLE. COLONEL FLICKINGER: They pretty well know it. ILLEGIBLE: ILLEGIBLE gets away from additional pay for extra hazard ILLEGIBLE insurance. It seems to me the idea of the hazardous pay ILLEGIBLE given pilots in World War I so that they could ILLEGIBLE with more insurance. DR. BOWMAN: I would like to express a divergent opinion on this point. ILLEGIBLE of the air force, of any fighting organization, as ILLEGIBLE this morning, should be to motivate people to fight ILLEGIBLE these missions. That, I think, is very sound. ILLEGIBLE sport company which gives a pilot extra money ILLEGIBLE takes more risk. There is prestige to consider; there is ILLEGIBLE uniforms; distinctive patches; decorations. ILLEGIBLE so things are involved. ILLEGIBLE with many family men flying and with veterans ILLEGIBLE done enough already, one hears a lot of gripping. But ILLEGIBLE go into those organizations volunteer to do so. They ILLEGIBLE against their will. That is, very few are. ILLEGIBLE question of having to pay them more. These ILLEGIBLE some important. But if we look at it from the standpoint ILLEGIBLE these pay differentials, I don't know where we even ILLEGIBLE do you think about that, Colonel Flickinger? COLONEL FLICKINGER: As mentioned at noon, we get into the vague entity ILLEGIBLE and apparently as far as I can evaluate this ILLEGIBLE more not at a particularly high level ILLEGIBLE outlook on motivation for another war. ILLEGIBLE are going to have as full an acceptance of a ILLEGIBLE the young man, the young air crewman, as ILLEGIBLE. ILLEGIBLE the young veteran or the next generation? COLONEL FLICKINGER: Either one. But that is getting pretty far ILLEGIBLE I think. This matter of national unity of ILLEGIBLE the willingness of our men to accept our ILLEGIBLE me greatly. CHAIRMAN SELLE: Let us come back to the question I raised a little ILLEGIBLE for the future, which I interpret to mean ILLEGIBLE. Our suggestions have been rather vague, I ILLEGIBLE to put it this way: Is there any point at ILLEGIBLE effort toward the final solution of ILLEGIBLE. Is there anything we can do within the next six months ILLEGIBLE? 47 DR. DORCUS: I think one problem we haven't given any attention to for immediate research is the area of trying to find out whether there ILLEGIBLE affects of radiation. I think there is room for work ILLEGIBLE. CHAIRMAN SELLE: Physical fitness effects will be undertaken by another group. DR. DORCUS: I see. All right, then. CHAIRMAN SELLE: Physiological experiments, but not psychological. DR. BOWMAN: Psychological tests, more than physiological tests, I think, ILLEGIBLE in the intellectual type of performance. DR. SELLS: Will pilot read his altimeter wrong when he gets 25 R? DR. BOWMAN: Will his reaction time slow up? CHAIRMAN SELLE: I might state that there is contemplated, though, perhaps for the future, some detailed work on radiation effects on man. The is a great need for that. When that will be done, I don't know, but possibly psychological studies can be correlated with those proposed in physiological effects. DR. DORCUS: I am thinking, for example, of such things as tension ILLEGIBLE a sustained level of making discriminations in judgment that ILLEGIBLE involved. CHAIRMAN SELLE: During irradiation? DR. DORCUS: Following exposure to radiation, or in the process of radiation, either. How long, if there are emotional effects, does it ILLEGIBLE force man to recover in order to perform again at appropriate levels. CHAIRMAN SELLE: It is possible that such studies could be done at a large hospital where facilities are adequate. DR. SELLS: Could that be done with your personnel at any of the atomic ILLEGIBLE? MR. KALITINSKY: I don't think so. CHAIRMAN SELLE: There the situation is quite different. They work on ILLEGIBLE of an r per day. That wouldn't help out at all. MR. KALITINSKY: If you attempt to bring somebody in fresh from the outside, I think you will get significant results. CHAIRMAN SELLE: A complicating factor in conducting such studies in patients subjected to relatively large doses of X-irradiation is that they are already disturbed individuals -- individuals who frequently are emotionally as well as physiologically ill. DR. DORCUS: It is true, but I am not talking about doses that produce obvious physiological responses. Very often psychological changes will show up when physiological alternations cannot be detected. 48 DR. BOWMAN: We see that with electric shock. Immediately after electric ILLEGIBLE with the electroencephalogram evidence of organic ILLEGIBLE. There is some contusion. That commonly disappears ILLEGIBLE three weeks as indicated by the electroencephalogram which ILLEGIBLE changes yet, that the rat is unable to learn the maze as quickly after it has been through a series of electric shock treatments. CHAIRMAN SELLE: I mean to say that we have included maze running in some ILLEGIBLE physiological studies, but possibly this work is more psychological. It might be an informative piece of work. ILLEGIBLE your earlier question, Dr. Dorcus, most of the conditions ILLEGIBLE the radiologists do not call for whole-body irradiation -- ILLEGIBLE localized irradiation. In a few diseases such as polycythemia, ILLEGIBLE and perhaps arthritis, whole body irradiation is carried out. DR. DORCUS: I think that could be extended to head radiation of a ILLEGIBLE nature as contrasted to other body area radiation; wouldn't the effects on these psychological functions be more pronounced or not? I don't know. i know they haven't been treated in the literature that ILLEGIBLE to me, because I have looked. DR. SELLS: I would like to propose that the suggestion be adopted for ILLEGIBLE formulating research problems. ILLEGIBLE offers enough promise to warrant further exploration. ILLEGIBLE whether or not a research program in that area could ILLEGIBLE very well be incorporated into a suggestion. CHAIRMAN SELLE: That is, I think, the first concrete proposal we have ILLEGIBLE. DR. SELLS: I would also like to second Colonel Flickinger's motion ILLEGIBLE of study he suggested. In thinking it over, I ILLEGIBLE to find out among different levels and different ILLEGIBLE military personnel it operational assign-ILLEGIBLE lead crews, navigators, bombardiers, radio ILLEGIBLE ground crews, and so forth, just what they know ILLEGIBLE attitudes are toward it, how they feel about ILLEGIBLE that misconceptions they have, and so forth. ILLEGIBLE be very valuable as background for study. CHAIRMAN SELLE: That is helpful. Do we have anything else to suggest? DR. SELLS: I have got one other thing. That is something that Dr. Dorcus and Dr. Bowman were talking about this morning with regard to anxiety. I agree entirely that anxiety can't be considered as a general thing among training personnel. In order to go to specific anxieties, something along the lines just mentioned would be good if we had a laboratory or a situation in which it could be investigated. It may be ILLEGIBLE some kind of realistic situation were established ILLEGIBLE had a reactor and could put men in and then after letting them ILLEGIBLE a while begin to explore. That procedure might be 49 valuable relating feeling of apprehension and anxiety concerning ILLEGIBLE problems that come up in that realistic situation with aspects ILLEGIBLE such as we get on Roschach examinations and various other approaches to the individual. DR. BOWMAN: There is a lead in the work of Pincus and the people at ILLEGIBLE in trying to show that the emergency response to anxiety situations in the schizophrenic is less than in the normal individual. ILLEGIBLE mechanisms doesn't seem to be as responsive in the schizophrenic. They tried to work out a number of real stress situations. We have just started to review this work, and I haven't got it clearly in mind yet, but the feeling is that faked stress situations are pretty ILLEGIBLE and some of them are physiological stresses rather than psychological. They concluded that the adrenal gland doesn't response normally in those conditions. Does the thyroid gland response? We know that radioactive iodine is ILLEGIBLE right and into the thyroid. We have been following it with a ILLEGIBLE and so forth. We have been arguing whether we can produce ILLEGIBLE stress situation for our patients and controls to determine ILLEGIBLE continually sick person the thyroid hehaves differently from normal. ILLEGIBLE to explore emotional stress situations; it is very difficult indeed to set up a real stress situation. It becomes so artificial, and was shown with work on hypnosis in which hypnotized patients would tap people with paper machetes and rubber daggers. Finally one ILLEGIBLE suggested to a lady who was doing this that she take off her clothes before the group, she wouldn't. However, she would carry-on with ILLEGIBLE out the window where there was a net to catch her. I think that shows the great danger of the artificiality of those planned ILLEGIBLE situations which are set to stimulate the real situation. Good testing conditions are not easily produced. MR. KALITINSKY: I would like to make a comment on the possibility of having a group of people work in a reactor. Let us say there are certain specific tests that we do where one gets a high level of radiation for which ILLEGIBLE, but where the exposure is timed so that the total is not dangerous. That in a way is a very good replica of the situation we are considering here because basically we are trying to design the airplane so that there will be no harm done. Although it is a large single dose, it is still designed so that the men will not receive any harm; and the indoctrination you give him is to say that he won't get substantially any harm as long as it stays within the time limit. DR. SELLS: You could introduce things such as a Geiger counter and say, "Now, when this thing hits 25, where the red light shows, we want you to stop and go outside." Some people will work right along just paying ILLEGIBLE casual attention to it, and others, when it gets up to 12, will immediately start moving for the door. 50 MR. KALITINSKY: You can produce that situation. As I visualize it, it ILLEGIBLE easily done. It might be worth doing. I think the ILLEGIBLE would be provided for assigning actual air crews for the observation. DR. SELLS: The chances are there is nobody in this group who could ILLEGIBLE and design, I presume, except your group. Few of us know what ILLEGIBLE looks like or how it could be used. CHAIRMAN SELLE: You don't build a reactor overnight. The possibility of ILLEGIBLE realistic situation where definite military assignment ILLEGIBLE the reason indicated with orders to designate people ILLEGIBLE such an assignment offer encouragement and represents the ILLEGIBLE yet. The work might be classified so that the subjects ILLEGIBLE about it outside. I don't see why that couldn't all be done ILLEGIBLE doing. MR. KALITINSKY: It could be done at Oak Ridge, at I-10. CHAIRMAN SELLE: Even now? MR. KALITINSKY: In some of the tests we have been running, people can ILLEGIBLE minutes, so they are under stress to get it done in ILLEGIBLE and get out. DR. BOWMAN: I think here you have an ideal situation and one which, a ILLEGIBLE anticipates the situation; so that it is about as real situation as you could get. MR. KALITINSKY: You see, the normal procedure there is for a health ILLEGIBLE to count the stuff. When he ILLEGIBLE tolerance, he calls them out. DR. DORCUS: Dr. Sells made a remark this morning that intrigued me. ILLEGIBLE something to this effect: It is the ILLEGIBLE then the hazard itself that is important ILLEGIBLE . The important to mind certain work that had been done and may have a ILLEGIBLE people that will be involved in these tests. For ILLEGIBLE will estimate a certain level of work ILLEGIBLE usually performs more poorly following that. ILLEGIBLE don't seem to be particularly bothered ILLEGIBLE estimate, but will go right along and make an estimate that will ILLEGIBLE the first estimate. ILLEGIBLE actually fits in with members of the crew conILLEGIBLE hazard, their estimate of the hazard and how they substantially react to it? That is a little bit hazy. I haven't had a chance to think through the problem very far. DR. SELLS: They could fit in the same type of situation, though. MR. KALITINSKY: It seems to me from the discussion it might be good idea to ILLEGIBLE certain recommendations, both to the group who are ILLEGIBLE the effects of radiation on physiological factors affecting performance fitness, and to Dr. Stone's group of human observation. 51 CHAIRMAN SELLE: I would like to say that I have had letters from Dr. Stone about this and he doesn't seem to want to consider anything but the physiological aspects of radiation. Possibly we can persuade him to consider psychological studies too. ILLEGIBLE Dr. Bowman was recommended to us for this committee by Dr. Stone. ILLEGIBLE latter stated, then that he wanted to stress the ILLEGIBLE observations and the psychological problems are ILLEGIBLE objects. If, however, human observations ILLEGIBLE some that the psychological studies could be made ILLEGIBLE physiological studies. Possibly our committee can work ILLEGIBLE Dr. Stone's. ILLEGIBLE some questions which I want to ask before we adjourn. ILLEGIBLE value of such organizations as the American Research ILLEGIBLE organization headed by Flanagan -- in work suggested by ILLEGIBLE consideration. Could this group be of value to us? DR. SELLS: I think I can answer that, because I know that organization and I know ILLEGIBLE. They have done work for the Atomic Energy Commission. They have several people now who reside at Oak Ridge -- ILLEGIBLE same one. ILLEGIBLE familiarity with air force problems; from the standpoint of ILLEGIBLE by A.E.C. and knowing their way around, they ILLEGIBLE. They ILLEGIBLE take on work of a very confidential nature, ILLEGIBLE also very competent investigators. ILLEGIBLE here is any project that could be set up where a ILLEGIBLE organization is not available and competent people ILLEGIBLE recommend that confidence be placed in them to ILLEGIBLE we might expect from any other organization. ILLEGIBLE be done. ILLEGIBLE should be formulated first ILLEGIBLE . Then invite a com-ILLEGIBLE commercial organization in to formulate it for us. ILLEGIBLE is helpful. Do you have any comment to make on ILLEGIBLE? COLONEL FLICKINGER: So, I agree with Dr. Sells on that. CHAIRMAN SELLE: Now, a word about the membership of this subcommittee. ILLEGIBLE enlarged to include individuals who have ILLEGIBLE psychological problems of atomic warfare. Some of our ILLEGIBLE could be very helpful; several have had consideration ILLEGIBLE studying reactions of civilians and the military ILLEGIBLE bomb tests. DR. BOWMAN: I think it would be desirable to have a good practical hardhanded person who has had experience in such situations whack up on those of us who have to consider the problem theoretically. I known relatively little about radiations as such and I suspect ILLEGIBLE know very much more than I. It seems to me you will want some individuals on the committee who have had practical experiences with situations such as we are discussing. 52 CHAIRMAN SELLE: That is what I had in mind. DR. DORCUS: May I ask a question in this connection? What is the function of this committee? CHAIRMAN SELLE: We want your advice in connection with the solution of the problem ILLEGIBLE we want your counsel on whether or not the radiation hazard ILLEGIBLE unique problem psychologically so far as pilot selection ILLEGIBLE and your suggestions for research in this field. ILLEGIBLE made today was that we go into the matter still ILLEGIBLE to obtain additional information which will affirm or ILLEGIBLE on this morning. ILLEGIBLE I don't know what the future has for this particular panel. ILLEGIBLE the Advisory Committee and it in turn will probably make suggestions. DR. DORCUS: That I had in mind was simply this. I can phrase at least ILLEGIBLE concerned with in this way: Is it the position of this committee to recommend research work that may come up in the future, or to consider problems that may be brought in for discussion to see whether they should be undertaken? CHAIRMAN SELLE: Yes, indeed, that is the purpose of the subcommittee. ILLEGIBLE your feeling that we need one or two additional committeemen ILLEGIBLE experience with psychological reactions of large groups of people to radiation hazards, I believe we could induce several of our special guests of this morning to serve, or to advise us from time to time. ILLEGIBLE don't know when this subcommittee will meet again. I will ILLEGIBLE the results of our deliberations to the Advisory Committee ILLEGIBLE will meet in the fall. It, in turn, will probably make recommendations to us. Is there anything further to come before this group? Mr. Kalitinsky, you have been working for a number of years on this problem. Have we answered some of the questions you have had? MR. KALITINSKY: I think so. I think enough questions were asked. CHAIRMAN SELLE: Yes, that is stating it better. Before we adjourn, I would like to make a suggestion which is probably unnecessary. If you have any ideas regarding the activities of the committee, I trust you will not hesitate to send them on. At he present time I am somewhat undecided as to how active we shall be and naturally the greater the need for this work, the sooner we will get busy. So we will release any comments you may have after you return to your respective homes. 53 COLONEL FLICKINGER: Dr. Selle, I would like to ask one question, I must ILLEGIBLE along in my own commend with the plan I mentioned this morning and to letter to you of trying to get a sampling of the estimate of the air crews as to this potential hazards. I would look forward to getting help from various members of the committee. ILLEGIBLE I feel free to either communicate with them through you, or directly? Or how would you like me to do that? I am not trying to ILLEGIBLE any additional work on the committee. CHAIRMAN SELLE: I would say that if you think it involves NEPA in any way ILLEGIBLE handle it through me. If it is a matter which does not involved NEPA you can deal directly with them. COLONEL FLICKINGER: I am of course anxious that whatever approach I take on estimating this situation be as sound as possible from the psychological standpoint. CHAIRMAN SELLE: We would be happy to know what you approach is with regard to radiation, but I don't know that we can say that you have to get through us. If it involves a nuclear propelled aircraft -- COLONEL FLICKINGER: I know I wouldn't have too, but I can put it this way. Would you be interested in my particular approach and what some ILLEGIBLE. CHAIRMAN SELLE: Indeed we will. COLONEL FLICKINGER: I am sure they wouldn't be of a classified nature. CHAIRMAN SELLE: I don't know that I shall be the permanent chairman of this subcommittee. The chairmanship was wished on me. I have no ILLEGIBLE for ILLEGIBLE like the work so far, but other members of our Advisory Committee might serve in a much better capacity. Are there any other questions or comments to be made? COLONEL FLICKINGER: The only comment I have is, I am equally glad that you called the meeting because it is conforming to me to know that the ILLEGIBLE problem is being considered by the group. CHAIRMAN SELLE: It is a start, and I hope that we will have another meeting, possibly six months from now. By then we should have considerably more information than we were able to give today. DR. SELLS: I understand that some transcripts of the meeting will be available? CHAIRMAN SELLE: Yes, I think that it will be possible to supply each member here a transcript. DR. SELLS: May I request some additional copies for the Commandant and some of the other persons in our organization? CHAIRMAN SELLE: All right. 54 DR. SELLS: They should receive it, because the event that any further participation in actual research comes through the School of Medicine, ILLEGIBLE be well informed of it. CHAIRMAN SELLE: Fine. I think we should have seventy-five copies made. DR. DORCUS: May I ask a further question just about procedures? I am ILLEGIBLE myself oriented. The report of this committee will go ILLEGIBLE Committee? CHAIRMAN SELLE: That is right. DR. DORCUS: And anything that we suggested, whether it is put into ILLEGIBLE or not, will depend upon the action taken by the full Committee. CHAIRMAN SELLE: I would say so. DR. DORCUS: How will that be initiated? Will it be initiated back ILLEGIBLE through the major Committee? A lot of these ILLEGIBLE many areas in which recommendations have been made; ILLEGIBLE some of these will involve considerable data ILLEGIBLE. CHAIRMAN SELLE: We ILLEGIBLE worry now about the details of planning. ILLEGIBLE done by this panel, the Advisory Committee ILLEGIBLE. DR. DORCUS: ILLEGIBLE often these things are left hanging between ILLEGIBLE committees. Nothing gets done back and forth, because ILLEGIBLE do anything. I am just wondering what this ILLEGIBLE. CHAIRMAN SELLE: ILLEGIBLE that connection that of the nine committees ILLEGIBLE. It may be unfortunate that we are the first, ILLEGIBLE to little to get our teeth into. ILLEGIBLE subcommittee to become activated so far as research ILLEGIBLE is true that before we can do anything ILLEGIBLE report to the Advisory Committee, and it in ILLEGIBLE in the green light. ILLEGIBLE to say, Mr. Kalitinsky? MR. KALITINSKY: No. CHAIRMAN SELLE: Gentlemen, I wish to thank you again for the time ILLEGIBLE you this problem. As stated, I hope you will write us with your additional views. If there is nothing further, the meeting stands adjourned. (Thereupon, at 3:05 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned) 55